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NOTES 
TIME FOR AN UPDATE: 
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING 
CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCIES 
Michael J. Deitch* 
 
Municipal bankruptcies have been making national news since the 
“Great Recession.”  Municipalities like Stockton, Vallejo, and Jefferson 
County gained notoriety for the record scale of their bankruptcy filings, 
only to be surpassed by Detroit shortly thereafter as the largest and most 
populous municipal bankruptcy filing.  Historically, municipal bankruptcy 
occurred infrequently, leaving the nuances of many critical issues, 
including insolvency, asset utilization, and good faith, unexplored in case 
law.  For example, how should a bankruptcy court analyze Detroit’s city-
owned art museum that houses billions of dollars of art when bondholders, 
pensioners, and other unsecured creditors have unpaid claims?  And how 
should a court determine if the city’s debt adjustment plan is fair at the 
confirmation phase, when recent proposals have left certain unsecured 
creditors receiving pennies on the dollar while others receive full value? 
This Note proposes that courts differentiate between one-time event 
bankruptcies and structurally imbalanced bankruptcies to evaluate the 
creditor notice, insolvency, and good faith provisions.  It suggests that 
utilization of nonessential assets should be considered in the insolvency and 
good faith analyses.  Finally, this Note offers heuristics and examples to 
provide texture for the analysis of future filings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Municipalities face increasing budgetary pressures for reasons including 
legacy pension and health care obligations, lagging revenue stemming from 
the “Great Recession,” and unanticipated performance of financial 
instruments.1  In the second quarter of 2014, the size of the U.S. municipal 
bond market was $3.66 trillion.2  In 2013, unfunded pension and health care 
liabilities for the largest sixty-one municipalities alone were $217 billion.3  
Municipalities cannot manipulate the currency that denominates their debt 
to facilitate repayment—a key tool available to sovereigns, like the federal 
government, that control their own currency.  Many municipalities also face 
state law constraints during efforts to raise taxes and assessments—revenue 
that is the lifeblood of a municipality.4  Given these limitations, 
municipalities at some point have to make difficult choices on the services 
they provide, attempt to adjust their debts, or both.5 
Municipalities take unique paths to reach dire straits, but generally, 
financial distress manifests itself in one of two ways—either a one-time 
event or a significant structural imbalance—that renders the municipality 
insolvent.6  One-time events, including a large adverse civil judgment,7 
fraudulent behavior,8 or investment pool losses,9 can cause “acute and 
immediate” financial crisis10 where a disproportionate financial stress 
renders insolvent an otherwise financially sound municipality.  At the other 
end of the spectrum are municipalities that experience protracted structural 
imbalances from a combination of issues that may include shrinking 
population, loss of tax base, legacy pension costs, unfunded health care 
costs, and infrastructure costs.11 
 
 1. See, e.g., Jeffrey B. Ellman & Daniel J. Merrett, Pensions and Chapter 9:  Can 
Municipalities Use Bankruptcy to Solve Their Pension Woes?, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 
365, 366–68 (2011). 
 2. SIFMA, US BOND MARKET ISSUANCE AND OUTSTANDING (2014), available at 
http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx. 
 3. See infra note 109. 
 4. See infra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 5. See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 
1118, 1120–22 (2014) (describing reductions in police forces, decisions not to provide 
services to certain segments of a municipality, and sales of buildings and land). See also In 
re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 112–21 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (describing Detroit’s 
failing public services and choices the city made prior to petitioning for bankruptcy). 
 6. JOHN KNOX & MARC LEVINSON, MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY:  AVOIDING AND USING 
CHAPTER 9 IN TIMES OF FISCAL STRESS 3–4 (Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP 2009), 
available at http://www.orrick.com/Events-and-Publications/Documents/1736.pdf. 
 7. See, e.g., In re Boise Cnty., 465 B.R. 156, 161, 164 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011) 
(describing a $4 million judgment against a county with a $9.3 million yearly budget). 
 8. See, e.g., In re Jefferson Cnty, 474 B.R. 228, 284–85 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012) 
(describing fraudulent behavior that contributed to massive debt from the county’s sewer 
reconstruction contracts). 
 9. See In re Cnty. of Orange, 179 B.R. 177, 179–80 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) 
(describing $524 million in losses from risky investments that resulted in large budget 
deficits). 
 10. See id. 
 11. See generally In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 112–16 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); 
In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 779–81 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013). 
2708 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
Detroit is a prime example of such structural imbalances.12   Economic 
decline, population loss, and other structural factors reduced Detroit’s tax 
base.13  The per capita tax burden on residents and businesses increased 
significantly while overall revenue collection declined due to population 
loss, deindustrialization, fiscal mismanagement, and other structural 
problems, leaving the city struggling to provide basic services for residents 
and businesses.14  In 2013, debt service obligations accounted for 42.5 
percent of Detroit’s yearly revenue.15  By 2017, debt service obligations are 
projected to rise to 65 percent of city revenues.16 
Regardless of a municipality’s path to financial trouble, states are 
constitutionally prohibited from adjusting a municipality’s contracts, 
leaving Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code as the sole mechanism a 
municipality can utilize for debt adjustment.17  Specifically, Chapter 9 
allows municipalities to restructure their debts under protection of the 
Bankruptcy Code.18  To file for Chapter 9 protection, the debtor must be a 
municipality that is specifically authorized by the state to be a debtor.19  
Additionally, the municipality must demonstrate insolvency and the desire 
to adjust its debts.20 
A federal bankruptcy court analyzes the petition at the eligibility phase 
and approves an eligible debtor’s debt adjustment plan if it meets all Code 
confirmation criteria.21  Many questions arise when analyzing eligibility:  Is 
the entity actually a municipality that is specifically authorized to file?  Is 
the debtor insolvent as defined in the Code?  Does the municipality have 
nonessential (e.g., art, equivalent monetary instruments, mineral reserves, 
etc.) or potential assets (e.g., tax increases, assessments, insurance policies, 
etc.), and did the municipality utilize those resources?  Has the municipality 
acted in good faith?  For example, in In re City of Detroit,22 the city owned 
several paintings each worth over $100 million as part of a 65,000 piece 
collection valued in the billions.23  Should Detroit be forced to liquidate 
some or all of the art to pay creditors, including bondholders and 
pensioners?  Should those nonessential and cash convertible assets be 
utilized in the insolvency calculation?  Or should they be considered in the 
 
 12. See generally Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications Pursuant to 
Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code at 2, Detroit, 504 B.R 97 (July 18, 2013) (No. 13-
53846) [hereinafter Detroit Memorandum]. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 1139.  Basic services can include infrastructure 
(water, sewer, and roads), education, and safety services (fire, police, and emergency 
medical services). Id. 
 15. Detroit Memorandum, supra note 12, at 3. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See infra Part I.C.1.  The U.S. Constitution forbids states from enacting any “law 
impairing the obligation of contract.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 18. See infra Part I.C. 
 19. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012); see infra Part I.C.4. 
 20. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c). 
 21. See John P. McNicholas, An Overview of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 2 J. 
PAYMENT SYS. L. 606, 606–07 (2006). 
 22. 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 23. See infra note 292 and accompanying text. 
2015] EVALUATING CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCIES 2709 
good faith analysis?  Finally, should these answers be the same if the 
bankruptcy is not a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, like Detroit, but 
rather a municipality that suffered from a detrimental one-time event, such 
as a disproportionately large judgment against a municipal authority?24 
Municipal bankruptcy involves many competing interests, from creditors, 
including secured and unsecured bondholders, retirees, contractors, and 
civil judgment holders, to city residents, who have basic service needs.25  
Some creditors are former employees and also citizens of the 
municipality—they worked for the municipality and expect their pensions 
and health care benefits as a form of deferred compensation.26  A careful 
balancing is required to ensure that a municipality can provide its residents 
with basic services such as fire protection, clean water, garbage removal, 
police protection, and functioning schools, while still protecting creditors’ 
rights.  After all, “[c]ities cannot go out of business.”27  Bankruptcy courts 
have the unenviable task of balancing these competing interests to avoid the 
moral hazards that can possibly arise.28 
This Note provides an updated framework for evaluating key portions of 
the Chapter 9 bankruptcy process.  Part I identifies what a municipality is, 
the services a municipality provides to its residents, and how a municipality 
is financed.  Part I also evaluates the reasons that municipalities become 
financially troubled and then pivots to outlining the fundamental framework 
of Chapter 9, the federal Municipal Bankruptcy Code. 
Part II outlines the conflicting judicial interpretations of Chapter 9 
bankruptcy factors, describing the differences between a one-time event 
bankruptcy and a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy.  Next, it explains the 
factors that are particularly relevant in Chapter 9 filings, and how they 
relate to each other when determining whether creditors had notice, whether 
the municipality was actually insolvent, how the municipality utilized any 
nonessential or potential assets, and whether the municipality acted in good 
faith throughout the bankruptcy process.  Part II then analyzes the different, 
and sometimes conflicting, approaches bankruptcy courts have applied 
when deciding whether a municipality has demonstrated each factor. 
Part III proposes a new multipart test for analyzing whether a 
municipality meets the statutory conditions required for Chapter 9 
municipal bankruptcy.  The test tailors four factors to apply to the two main 
 
 24. See, e.g., In re McCurtain Mun. Auth., No. 07-80363, 2007 WL 4287604, at *6 
(Bankr. E.D. Okla. Dec. 4, 2007) (describing the low-income community’s financial 
capacity and holding that the failure to generate revenue from additional tax assessments on 
residents was not evidence of bad faith). 
 25. See infra Part I.B. 
 26. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 1123–24. 
 27. In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 336 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (stating that the 
purpose of Chapter 9 is to enable a financially distressed city to continue to provide essential 
services while it works out a plan to adjust its debts). Id. 
 28. As used here, “moral hazard” may be defined as “the tendency of debtors to prefer to 
devote their resources to their own interests instead of repaying their debts.” Michael W. 
McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke:  A Conceptual Introduction to 
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 426 (1993). 
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types of municipal bankruptcy—one-time event bankruptcies and 
significant long-term structural imbalance bankruptcies.  The factors weigh 
(1) whether creditors had notice of specific authorization; (2) whether the 
petition is prospective or current; (3) the pre-petition utilization of available 
assets; and (4) good faith at the petition and confirmation phases. 
I.   A “MUNICIPALITY”:  WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT PROVIDES, 
HOW IT IS FINANCED, AND HOW IT LANDS IN FISCAL TROUBLE 
Part I provides an overview of a municipality, including what a 
municipality is, what it does, and the constraints it faces in operating.  Part 
I.A examines the statutory definition of “municipality” in Chapter 9 of the 
Bankruptcy Code and reviews how bankruptcy courts implement the 
definition when evaluating whether an entity is in fact a municipality as 
defined in the Code.  Part I.B. details the services that a municipality 
provides to its residents and outlines the methods—both traditional and 
recent—that municipalities use to finance their operations, and it examines 
the types of assets that a municipality may possess.  Part I.B also analyzes 
the budgetary constraints and financial stressors that municipalities often 
face.  Finally, Part I.C provides an overview of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
A.   What Is a “Municipality”? 
The dictionary defines “municipality” as “a primarily urban political unit 
having corporate status and usually powers of self-government,”29 and 
common usage evinces thoughts of a city, county, or town.  But the term 
municipality has a much wider definition in the Chapter 9 context.30  The 
Bankruptcy Code defines “municipality” as a “political subdivision or 
public agency or instrumentality of a State.”31  This section analyzes how 
different entities are treated under the Bankruptcy Code’s municipal 
provisions. 
1.   Clear Examples of a Municipality:  Counties and Cities 
Cities are generally considered municipalities under Chapter 9, and 
creditors typically do not challenge a city’s status as a municipality.  For 
example, in Detroit, the parties stipulated that Detroit was a municipality, 
which the court accepted.32  Similarly, in In re City of Stockton,33 the 
 
 29. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 817 (11th ed. 2003). 
 30. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2012); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.02 (Alan N. 
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2014) (stating that the definition of municipality 
was intended to “broaden the applicability” of Chapter 9); see also In re Barnwell Cnty. 
Hosp., 471 B.R. 849, 858–59 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2012) (“[T]he Court construes broadly 
§ 109(c)’s eligibility requirements.”). 
 31. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2012). 
 32. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 129 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 33. 493 B.R. 772 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013). 
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objectors to Stockton’s Chapter 9 eligibility conceded that Stockton was a 
“municipality” under Chapter 9.34 
Counties also are generally considered municipalities, and state charter 
definitions of “county” fit squarely within Chapter 9’s definition of 
“municipality.”35  For instance, in Idaho, the state charter defines “county” 
as a “body politic of the state,” making Boise County a political subdivision 
of the state and thus a municipality.36  Likewise, in In re County of 
Orange,37 the court stated “[c]learly, the County is a municipality under the 
Code,”38 noting that because Orange County was created by the State of 
California and had express sovereign powers, including taxation and the 
ability to sue and be sued, it was “by definition a municipality.”39  In In re 
Jefferson County,40 it was apparently so clear that Jefferson County was a 
municipality for purposes of Chapter 9 that the court assumed that the 
county was a municipality without formally addressing the question.41 
2.   Special Purpose Entities:  Is It a “Municipality”? 
Under Chapter 9, municipalities may also include housing authorities, 
school districts, and toll roads.42  For example, a bankruptcy court held that 
a hospital qualified as a municipality and was an “instrumentality of the 
state” because the city council essentially controlled the hospital’s budget 
and board of directors.43  In another case, a bankruptcy court held that a 
transit district—created under state-enabling statutes and “bearing many 
strong aspects of local authority and equally strong aspects of state 
authority”—was a hybrid organization that qualified as a municipality as 
defined by Chapter 9.44 
Public control is also relevant when distinguishing between private and 
public agencies, as can be the case with service-providing authorities.45  In 
Ex parte York County Natural Gas Authority,46 the court held that the 
power granted by the state authorizing legislation—empowering the 
municipality to “purchase, lease . . . maintain and operate natural gas 
distribution systems” and conferring a full set of management powers and 
duties, as well as the power to issue revenue bonds—was sufficient to 
qualify the entity as a public agency under Chapter 9’s municipality 
 
 34. See id. at 783. 
 35. See In re Boise Cnty., 465 B.R. 156, 167 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011). 
 36. Id. 
 37. In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 38. Id. at 600. 
 39. Id. at 600 n.11. 
 40. 474 B.R. 228 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30, ¶ 900.02. 
 43. See In re Barnwell Cnty. Hosp., 471 B.R. 849, 859–60 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2012). 
 44. In re Westport Transit Dist., 165 B.R. 93, 95–96 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court concluded that the state 
statutes did not authorize the municipality for Chapter 9 relief. See id. at 96–98. 
 45. See In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770, 784 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010). 
 46. 238 F. Supp. 964 (W.D.S.C. 1965), modified on other grounds by Mozingo v. York 
Cnty. Natural Gas Auth., 352 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1965). 
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definition.47  The court stated that “‘[t]he legal test between a private or 
public authority or agency is whether the authority or agency is subject to 
control by public authority, state or municipal.’”48 
Courts have clarified that whether an entity is a municipality depends not 
only on the “level of State control over the entity’s organization and 
operations, but also the intent of the State that created it.”49  A complete 
absence of public control likely indicates that the entity is not a Chapter 9 
municipality.50  For example, in In re Ellicott School Building Authority,51 
the court held that a school building authority created under a nonprofit 
corporation act, which had no taxing or assessment authority and issued 
revenue bonds that disclosed no public control and were serviced solely 
with proceeds from school district rent, was not a municipality.52  The court 
noted that “no governmental entity exercises any right of control” over the 
building agency, and thus it was not a Chapter 9 municipality.53 
While lack of public control is strong evidence of against municipality 
status, the existence of public control does not automatically indicate a 
municipality.54  If the control is more akin to regulatory control, as, for 
example, often exhibited in the gambling, energy, and taxi industries, then 
the entity is not a municipality.55 
Finally, courts consider the state’s statutory classification of an entity.56  
If a state designates and treats an entity as an instrumentality of the state, 
the court is likely to find the state’s designation heavily persuasive due to 
the underlying state control issues.57  In In re Sullivan County Regional 
Refuse Disposal District,58 the court gave significant deference to how the 
refuse disposal district was classified under state law.59  Similarly, in 
Orange County, when the Orange County Investment Pool (OCIP) 
petitioned for Chapter 9 along with the county itself, the court held that 
OCIP was not a municipality.60  First, the court questioned whether OCIP 
was a “political subdivision,” and it found that the investment pool had 
“neither sovereign power delegated to it by the State of California, nor [did] 
it have by its existence some inherent sovereign power to act.”61  Second, it 
held that OCIP was not a public agency, finding that the pool “was not 
 
 47. Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 784 (quoting York Cnty. Natural Gas Auth., 
238 F. Supp. at 966). 
 48. York Cnty. Natural Gas Auth., 238 F. Supp. at 976. 
 49. Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 784. 
 50. See id. 
 51. 150 B.R. 261 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992). 
 52. See Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 785–86. 
 53. Id. at 786. 
 54. Id. at 785. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30, ¶ 900.02. 
 57. See In re Sullivan Cnty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 73 (Bankr. 
D.N.H. 1994). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. at 73. 
 60. In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 602–03 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 61. Id. at 602. 
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organized for the purpose of maintaining or operating a revenue producing 
enterprise” and did not issue bonds of any type.62  Third, the court held that 
OCIP was not an instrumentality of the state, because OCIP did not share 
the “characteristics and objectives” of the entities described in the previous 
versions of the Code.63 
In summary, Congress intended, and courts apply, a relatively broad 
definition of municipality.  The Chapter 9 definition of municipality 
encompasses political subdivisions including counties, cities, and towns, 
and it also includes entities such as toll roads, hospitals, and housing 
authorities if the entity satisfies a three-part analysis:  (1) whether the entity 
has “powers typically associated with sovereignty,” (2) “whether the entity 
has a public purpose and the level of [state] control” over its activities, and 
(3) the state’s designation of the entity.64 
B.   Factors Giving Rise to Insolvency 
A municipality may provide a broad range of services based on the 
statutory authorization in the state.  Part I.B.1 outlines the type of services 
that a municipality provides and how the municipality finances the services 
it provides.  Then, Part I.B.2 identifies typical reasons that a municipality 
enters into fiscal duress. 
1.   What Municipalities Provide and How They Finance It 
Municipalities may provide very broad or relatively narrow services 
depending on the power granted by the state.65  A typical city or county 
provides basic services to its residents and businesses—from safety services 
like fire, police, and emergency medical services to infrastructure, which 
may include water, sewer, roads, and transportation systems.66  Other 
municipalities may provide a single narrow service—either public housing, 
or transportation systems, or health care.67 
Municipalities have the right to acquire property, including real property 
and personal property, for their use and benefit.68  The power to hold, sell, 
and convey property is often expressed in statutory or charter provisions, 
although the power to purchase and possess land and chattel is a common 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 603.  The court noted that the definition of “municipality” in 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(40) did not explain the limits of the broad statutory language, whereas earlier code 
versions provided a list of entities. Id. at 601–02.  The court chose not to erode prior 
bankruptcy law, absent a clear contrary directive from Congress. Id. at 602. 
 64. See supra notes 32–63; 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30, ¶ 900.02 (citing 
In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770, 789 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010)). 
 65. See, e.g., Detroit Memorandum, supra note 12, at 9–10.  Detroit has “comprehensive 
home rule power under the State Constitution of 1963 . . . the Home Rule City Act and the 
2012 [City] Charter . . . subject to the limitations on the exercise of that power contained in 
the Constitution, the Charter or applicable Michigan statute.” Id. at 9. 
 66. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 1139. 
 67. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 68. See 10 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 28:2 (3d ed. 2014). 
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law power held by municipalities.69  Municipalities may own “essential 
assets,” i.e., those directly related to providing services, such as government 
buildings, vehicles, supplies, and infrastructure systems.70  Municipalities 
may also own nonessential assets, which this Note defines as assets that the 
municipality owns but are not critical to providing public services.  
Nonessential assets may include art, equivalent monetary instruments, 
mineral reserves, and seized, abandoned, or unused property.71  For 
example, a municipality may have art in a museum, a warehouse, or in city 
buildings.72  It could have equivalent monetary reserves—such as coin or 
gold reserves—that have been in a municipal vault for years, which are 
convertible to cash.  Or a municipality may have extractible mineral 
reserves—such as oil, diamonds, or precious metals—on or beneath public 
lands.73  Finally, a municipality may own property that it has seized due to 
tax defaults, or that it has abandoned as no longer functional.74 
Municipalities, whether they provide comprehensive or limited services, 
have to generate sufficient funding to pay for the public services they 
provide.75  Municipalities have myriad methods to generate revenue 
depending on their authorizing statutes, but generally the methods fall into 
several broad categories, including taxes,76 municipal bonds,77 trade 
credit,78 and deferred debt.79 
Municipalities use taxes as a mechanism to raise revenue for operations.  
The state, possessing the power to tax, may confer or delegate taxing power 
 
 69. See id. 
 70. See David S. Kupetz, Standards for Confirming a Chapter 9 Plan of Debt 
Adjustment:  Incorporating and Diverging from Chapter 11 Plan Standards, 32 CAL. 
BANKR. J. 289, 290–91 (2012) (stating that services and programs involving “public safety, 
health, and welfare are likely to be viewed as essential”).  Kupetz suggests that a program or 
service is likely to be deemed essential when the program or service:  (1) is legally 
mandated; (2) contributes to the protection of health and safety or mitigates risk; 
(3) contributes to preservation of essential assets; or (4) is necessary to maintain quality of 
life and the “negative impact of eliminating or reducing such programs and services can be 
demonstrated and is significant.” Id. 
 71. See generally In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); City of 
Shreveport v. Kahn, 194 La. 55, 76 (1939). See also McConnell & Picker, supra note 28, at 
432, 462–63 (discussing pre-Bankruptcy Code historical division of municipal property into 
proprietary versus non-proprietary, where proprietary property was “held in [the 
municipality’s] own right for profit or a source of revenue, not charged with any public trust 
or use.”).  Examples of proprietary property included unused vacant lots or property seized 
by the municipality. 
 72. See generally Detroit, 504 B.R. 97. 
 73. See 47 A.L.R.3d 19 (1973); see, e.g., Kahn, 194 La. at 76 (1939). Municipalities 
may also lease oil and mineral rights pursuant to the rights and restrictions in their charter 
and legal restrictions. 
 74. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 28, at 432 n.29–30. 
 75. See 64A C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 2019 (2014). 
 76. See id. 
 77. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS:  STATE 
LAW, BANKRUPTCY, AND DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS 2 (2014), available at 
http://www.nabl.org/uploads/cms/documents/GENERAL_OBLIGATION_MUNICIPAL_B
ONDS.pdf. 
 78. See generally 64A C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 2016. 
 79. See infra notes 107–10 and accompanying text. 
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to a municipality.80  Taxing power is generally granted to a municipality 
and is essential to its existence.81  Municipalities may levy various types of 
taxes depending on their statutory grant from the state, but general 
municipal taxes include income, transaction, and occupancy tax.82  Other 
taxes may include franchise, property, convention, and tourism taxes.83 
Although taxes are a primary way that municipalities generate funds, 
they also issue bonds to finance investments and expenditures.84  In the 
context of municipal finance, two types of bonds—general obligation bonds 
and special revenue bonds—are most prevalent.85  General obligation bonds 
are sold to raise capital, where the principal and interest payments are 
backed by the “irrevocabl[e] pledge[]” of the “full faith, credit, and 
resources” of the city.86  The city is obligated in “good faith [to] use its 
resources as may be authorized or required by law” to ensure prompt 
payment.87 
General obligation bonds can be constructed as unlimited tax general 
obligation bonds (UTGOs), limited tax general obligation bonds (LTGOs), 
and general obligation bonds payable from the issuer’s general fund 
(GFGOs).88  GFGOs have no specific pledge of taxing power, LTGOs are 
secured by a limited property tax, and UTGOs are secured by unlimited 
property taxes.89  However, voter approval is generally required to issue 
unlimited tax obligations and sometimes is required for limited tax 
obligations.90 
While general obligations are enforceable under state law, the 
commitment is “made against the backdrop of federal bankruptcy law,”91 
and if bankruptcy is successfully invoked, federal bankruptcy law preempts 
state law.92  Additionally, although secured by the “full faith and credit” of 
the issuing municipality, general obligation bonds are unsecured for the 
purposes of Chapter 9.93  If the issuing municipality files a Chapter 9 
petition, the abilities of creditors to enforce their rights is prevented by the 
 
 80. See 64A C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 2219. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. § 2260. 
 83. See id.  For example, Detroit levies multiple taxes including a 2.0 percent business 
income tax, a 2.4 percent resident income tax, a 68.95 millage property tax, a 5 percent 
utility user’s tax, and a 10.9 percent casino user’s tax. See infra notes 245–49 and 
accompanying text. 
 84. See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, supra note 77. 
 85. See SEC, MUNICIPAL BONDS: UNDERSTANDING CREDIT RISK 1–2 (2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/municipalbondsbulletin.pdf. 
 86. NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, supra note 77, at 2. 
 87. Id. (emphasis removed). 
 88. Id. at 3. 
 89. Id. at 4. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 
1047 (1997).  Thus, the city’s pledge can be modified or discharged using a successful 
Chapter 9 petition. 
 92. See infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 93. Kordana, supra note 91, at 1048. 
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automatic stay provisions,94 and their ability to receive future payments is 
contingent on the debtor’s confirmation plan.95 
Revenue bonds are the second main source of municipal borrowing.  
Revenue bonds are backed by a revenue stream derived from a specific 
project, source, or operation.96  The Bankruptcy Code provides that special 
revenues can be derived from (A) project or system ownership or operation; 
(B) special excise taxes on specific transactions; (C) incremental tax 
receipts from the area benefited from the financing; (D) other revenues 
from particular debtor functions; or (E) specific taxes levied for project 
finance.97  Special revenues are exempt from the § 922(d) automatic stay 
provisions, requiring the municipality to continue providing the revenue 
stream to the creditor.98 
Municipalities also contract with suppliers, contractors, and individuals 
to provide the materials and services that they need for operations.99  Trade 
creditor agreements allow the municipality to receive goods and services 
and then pay for those goods and services in a specified amount of time.100  
A trade creditor can be a paper supplier, building contractor, or asphalt 
provider.  Municipalities have a great deal of flexibility when dealing with 
trade creditors in bankruptcy.101  For example, a municipality is free to 
determine whether it will pay pre-petition claims without bankruptcy court 
approval.102  In Jefferson County, the commissioners decided to pay 
undisputed trade debts as they became due.103  While trade creditors may 
fare reasonably well in city and county bankruptcy, they do not fare as well 
when the municipality is a special purpose municipality.104  Trade creditors 
as a group are often numerous and may have widely varying debts, and 
 
 94. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 922(a) (2012).  The automatic stay provisions prevent a creditor 
from the commencement or continuance of any proceeding seeking to enforce a claim 
against the debtor, essentially putting a creditor’s efforts on hold. See 11 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1).  
However, special revenues are exempt from the automatic stay. Id. § 922(d). 
 95. See Kordana, supra note 91, at 1048. 
 96. See SEC, supra note 85, at 2. 
 97. 11 U.S.C. § 902(2). 
 98. Id. § 922(d).  Chapter 9’s only limitation on the special revenue stream is that the 
revenues are subject to the “necessary operating expenses” of the project or system. See id. § 
928(b). 
 99. See David S. Kupetz, Understanding the Unique Factors of Chapter 9 Municipal 
Bankruptcies, in REPRESENTING CREDITORS IN CHAPTER 9 MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY:  
LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING PROCESS, COUNSELING 
MUNICIPALITIES, AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS AND CASES (2014) [hereinafter 
REPRESENTING CREDITORS], available at 2014 WL 4785315, at *4. 
 100. See id. 
 101. Jay Bender, New Developments, New Issues for Creditors and Debtors in Chapter 9 
Bankruptcy Cases, in REPRESENTING CREDITORS, supra note 99, available at 2014 WL 
4785314, at *6 (municipalities may choose to pay pre-petition trade claims without court 
approval). 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id.  When the debtor is a special purpose municipality, it is often more critical to 
conserve cash to fund the continued operation of that special purpose during bankruptcy. Id.  
Cities and counties, on the other hand, need to continue operating a series of services that 
may not be provided by the creditor if payments are withheld. Id. 
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therefore, negotiations may be difficult without a representative creditor.105  
Regardless, Chapter 9’s automatic stay still enjoins trade creditors from 
enforcing their contractual rights after a municipality petitions for 
bankruptcy, and can land them in a class of unsecured creditors in a Chapter 
9 proceeding.106 
Municipality employees with defined pensions and health care benefits 
are creditors of a municipality.107  Like trade creditors, pensioners generally 
have numerous claimants without a specific representative to collectively 
represent the group.108  Recently, a Pew Charitable Trust study of sixty-one 
large cities in the United States found that those cities have $217 billion in 
unfunded pension and health care liabilities.109  The gap, however, was 
unevenly distributed, with only 40 percent of the cities maintaining funding 
of at least 80 percent, and four of the cities exhibiting funding levels at or 
below 50 percent.110 
2.   The Current Landscape:  Municipal Stressors 
Municipal financial stressors at a micro-level are unique to each 
municipality—a natural result arising from myriad factors including state 
and local fiscal policy, geography, educational systems, population flow, 
and infrastructural demands.111  However, at a macro-level the stressors can 
be grouped into general issues facing each municipality.  Generally, a 
municipality is rendered insolvent either by a disproportionate one-time 
financial event or a significant structural financial imbalance that occurs 
over a period of time.112 
a.   One-Time Financial Event Stressors 
One-time events can cause an “acute and immediate” financial crisis, 
where the disproportionate financial stress renders insolvent an otherwise 
seemingly solvent municipality.113  A one-time event can manifest itself in 
multiple forms based on the specific circumstances of a municipality.  For 
instance, a large adverse civil judgment may be so substantial in relation to 
 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. at *9. 
 107. See Kupetz, supra note 99, at *2. 
 108. See Bender, supra note 101, at *11.  While pensioners are generally represented by 
unions during their employment, when they retire, they no longer are represented by the 
union.  Unions can intercede on behalf of the pensioners, but they need to be granted 
authority by the pensioners to negotiate a deal. See id. at *6. 
 109. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, A WIDENING GAP IN CITIES:  SHORTFALLS IN FUNDING 
FOR PENSIONS AND RETIREE HEALTH CARE 2 (2013), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org 
/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2013/Pewcitypensionsreportpdf.pdf (basing the 
results off data from the largest city in each state and every city with a population over 
500,000). 
 110. See id. at 7, 13. 
 111. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text. 
 112. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 113. See In re Cnty. of Orange, 179 B.R. 177, 179 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). 
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a municipality’s budget that it cannot make currently due payments.114  
Other one-time circumstances include fraudulent behavior, where once 
discovered causes an immediate financial stress that prevents a municipality 
from paying its bills,115 and investment pool losses, where a municipality 
makes unfortunate investment decisions that lead to disproportionately 
large losses in relation to the municipality’s budget.116 
For example, Orange County entered dire fiscal straits in 1991 due to 
investment pool losses triggered by investments that were “risky, volatile, 
and lacked liquidity.”117  The strategy involved short-term borrowing to 
purchase long-term securities, constructed around a bet that interest rates 
would remain low.118  When short-term rates rose, the value of the 
investment portfolio dropped while, simultaneously, the creditors called the 
short-term debt, causing losses from the early liquidation of the 
collateral.119  The treasurer was essentially gambling that interest rates 
would not rise, and when that bet failed, the investment portfolio 
collapsed.120 
Financial fraud on the part of public employees, their agents, or both, can 
rapidly deteriorate a municipality’s finances and lead to a one-time event 
bankruptcy.121  The most egregious recent example of this was Jefferson 
County, Alabama, where a special revenue warrant structure was used to 
finance an updated sewer system, but many of the agreements were 
obtained as a result of bribery and fraud committed by county 
employees.122 
While the above examples are hardly comprehensive, the basic concept 
encompasses any specific circumstance that causes a financial shock that 
directly impacts solvency, as compared to a structurally imbalanced 
insolvency, which manifests itself over a significant period of time due to 
multiple factors. 
b.   Structurally Imbalanced Municipality Liabilities 
At the other end of the spectrum, municipalities experience protracted 
structural imbalances from a combination of issues.  This section describes 
legacy pension and health care costs, analyzes deindustrialization and the 
corresponding effects on a municipality, outlines reduced tax revenue, and 
reviews poor fiscal mismanagement.123 
 
 114. See, e.g., In re Boise Cnty., 465 B.R. 156, 163 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011). 
 115. See In re Jefferson Cnty., 474 B.R. 228, 284–85 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012). 
 116. See Cnty. of Orange, 179 B.R. at 179–80. 
 117. In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 597 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 118. See id. at 597–98.  The investment was set up as a “reverse repo,” where the county 
“borrowed” by selling a security with an agreement to purchase the security in a short period 
of time, essentially “leveraging” their portfolio. Id. at 598 n.4. 
 119. See id. at 598. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See generally In re Jefferson Cnty., 474 B.R. 228, 239 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012). 
 122. See id. at 239–40. 
 123. See generally In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
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i.   Public Pensions and Health Care 
Public pensions remain a major and growing stressor to municipal 
budgets, as the promise of deferred benefits became politically popular124 
and life expectancy concurrently increased.125  Public unions became 
popular in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when municipal governments 
increasingly authorized unionization.126  Between 1960 and 2010, life 
expectancy leaped from 69.7 years to 78.7 years.127  Unlike their private 
sector counterparts that are regulated by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974128 (ERISA), public pensions are not regulated by 
federal law nor are they protected by the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC).129  Although subject to state level controls, 
municipalities operate with significant freedom to authorize and implement 
funding methods and policies.130  In previous years, negotiations with 
unions often resulted in generous deferred benefit packages that combined 
politically palpable promises involving less short term budgetary impact 
with a “less-than-rigid” fiscal approach to paying those deferred benefits.131  
For example, in Stockton, California, the police pension plan allows 
officers to retire at age 50 with pensions amounting to up to 90 percent of 
their salary, including yearly cost of living adjustments.132 
ii.   Deindustrialization 
Deindustrialization is common to many cities and counties that 
experience fiscal difficulties and is often an underlying cause of 
bankruptcy.133  Cities that were constructed around a predominant industrial 
employer that has since left or significantly changed experience a vacuum 
of jobs and tax revenue.134  Older cities on the West Coast, previously 
supported by military bases, experienced the loss of a main employer when 
that base was decommissioned.135  Several of the recent California Chapter 
9 petitions were made by cities with origins as commercial ports and 
military bases.136  San Bernardino was home to Norton Air Force Base, a 
 
 124. See, e.g., Philip Greenspun, History of Public Employee Unions, PHILIP 
GREENSPUN’S WEBLOG (Sept. 7, 2009), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2009/09/07 
/history-of-public-employee-unions/. 
 125. See, e.g., Life Expectancy at Birth by Race and Sex, 1930–2010, INFOPLEASE, 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005148.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). 
 126. See Greenspun, supra note 124. 
 127. See Life Expectancy at Birth by Race and Sex, 1930–2010, supra note 125. 
 128. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 
(2012) and scattered section of 26 U.S.C.). 
 129. See Ellman & Merritt, supra note 1, at 368. 
 130. See id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Mary Williams Walsh, Judge Approves Bankruptcy Exit for Stockton, Calif., N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 30. 2014, 8:46 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/judge-approves-
bankruptcy-exit-for-stockton-calif/?_r=0. 
 133. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 1128–34. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. at 1134–35. 
 136. See id. at 1134. 
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major logistics and freight transport facility, for fifty-three years.137  
Stockton, a commercial port, also housed a Naval Reserve Center for the 
duration of the Cold War, until decommissioning in 1996.138  And Vallejo 
developed around Mare Island Naval base—an employer of 50,000 workers 
in World War II—that eventually was also decommissioned in 1996.139  In 
the Midwest, municipalities recorded significant population decreases as 
industrial output declined and people shifted to the suburbs, different parts 
of the country, and overseas.140  Deindustrialization can lead directly and 
indirectly to reduced tax revenue.141 
iii.   Reduced Tax Revenue 
A city’s tax revenue is a variable revenue stream that can change due to 
macro-level effects, such as a financial recession, or local effects including 
deindustrialization, population loss, and the resultant reduced property 
values.142  After the “Great Recession” in 2008–2009, the remnants of the 
financial crisis caused the 112 largest U.S. cities to experience per capita 
revenue reductions of 5 percent between 2007 and 2011.143  Concurrently, 
average real per capita expenditures were 2.6 percent higher in 2011 than 
2007.144 
City by city, the effect can be more dramatic—for example, Detroit’s 
income tax revenues declined 30 percent between 2002 and 2013, while 
property tax revenues declined 10 percent between 2012 and 2013 alone.145 
iv.   Fiscal (Mis)management 
Fiscal mismanagement can also precipitate financial problems, either in 
conjunction with other financial stressors or on its own.146  Fiscal 
mismanagement can be related to collective bargaining agreements 
discussed above, or it can be related to other bad contracts, financial 
investments, or infrastructure costs.147  For instance, some municipalities 
utilize interest-rate swap agreements to hedge against higher interest 
 
 137. See id. at 1134–35. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See generally Michael J. Minkus, Fighting Uncertainty: Municipal Partnerships 
with Redevelopment Agencies Can Mitigate Uncertainty to Encourage Brownfield 
Redevelopment, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 272 (2007). 
 141. See id. at 299 n.221 (deindustrialization may “leav[e] communities with withering 
infrastructures and bereft of tax revenue” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 142. See generally Detroit Memorandum, supra note 12. 
 143. Newly Released Data Show Long-Lasting Impact of the Great Recession on Cities, 
PR NEWSWIRE, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/newly-released-data-show-long-
lasting-impact-of-the-great-recession-on-cities-259268141.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). 
 144. Id. 
 145. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 119 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 146. See, e.g., In re Jefferson Cnty., 474 B.R. 228, 235–45 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012). 
 147. See, e.g., In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). 
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rates.148  Swaps are effective hedges against high interest rates, but some 
critics worry that elected officials do not have a full understanding of swap 
products and their ramifications when compared to their investment banker 
counterparties.149  The swap agreement is generally arranged so the 
municipality exchanges its floating interest rate for a fixed interest rate.150  
Municipalities enter the agreements because floating rates are lower than 
fixed rate debt.151  When rates fall and stay low—as has been the case in the 
United States since 2008—the swaps can cost municipalities significant 
money.152  The counterpoint is that municipalities benefitted when rates 
turned in their favor, and with an effective hedging technique, the swaps 
can be advantageous to municipal borrowers.153 
Fraudulent behavior or risky financial investments, as discussed in the 
one-time event bankruptcies of Orange County and Jefferson County,154 
can be part of the equation in structurally imbalanced bankruptcies as well.  
When fraudulent behavior or risky investments are present in a structurally 
imbalanced bankruptcy, they simply compound an already bleak financial 
condition.  Regardless of how a municipality’s financial trouble arises, the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism to adjust its debts. 
C.   The Bankruptcy Code:  An Overview 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code is separated into chapters which outline 
general provisions (Chapter 1), relate to case administration (Chapter 3), 
provide provisions dealing with the creditors, debtor, and estate (Chapter 5), 
as well as adjustment of a municipality’s debts (Chapter 9) and business 
reorganization (Chapter 11).155  Chapter 9 excludes all provisions of the 
Code except Chapter 1 and Chapter 9, although § 901 does invoke 
particular Code sections in Chapters 3, 5, and 11.156   
Chapter 9 is the focus of Parts II and III. 
1.   Historical Underpinnings and Constitutional Limits 
Municipal bankruptcy legislation in the United States is a relatively new 
phenomenon, originating in the 1930s in response to rapidly deteriorating 
 
 148. Interest-rate swaps trade a stream of interest payments for payments based on a fixed 
principal.  Generally, a floating interest rate is traded for a fixed interest rate to hedge risk. 
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 937 (10th ed. 2014). 
 149. Aaron Lucchetti, Interest-Rate Deals Sting Cities, States, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 22, 
2010), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703775504575135930211329798. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. For example, if a municipality swapped a variable interest rate of 6 percent 
for a fixed interest rate of 8 percent, and the variable interest rate then goes down to 3.5 
percent, the municipality is “losing” 4.5 percent on each payment relative to what it would 
have paid without the swap. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See supra Part I.B.2.a. 
 155. 1 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 
§ 11:1 (3d. 2014). 
 156. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 103(e), 901 (2012). 
2722 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
municipal finances during the Great Depression.157  Prior to federal 
municipal bankruptcy law, a creditor’s remedy was generally limited to a 
mandamus order to raise taxes, which often had deleterious effects because 
of the massive financial strain, resulting in defaulted assessments as tax 
sales drove down property values and exacerbated tax delinquency.158  
States, when they ratified the Constitution, granted bankruptcy regulatory 
powers to the federal government, specifically providing Congress with the 
power “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies 
throughout the United States.”159  The U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause provides that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land” 
and specifies that states shall be bound by federal law.160  Essentially, if the 
federal government’s exercise of power is proper, federal law will preempt 
any and all conflicting or inconsistent state law.161 
Since the Municipal Bankruptcy Code’s inception, it has walked the 
tenuous line between the federal powers and state sovereignty provided by 
the Constitution.162  In 1936, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Ashton v. 
Cameron County Water Improvement District,163 held that the 1934 
municipal bankruptcy legislation unconstitutionally interfered with state 
sovereignty.164  The Court expressed concern that if a federal bankruptcy 
court could engage in readjustment of debt obligations of a state, or one of 
its “political subdivisions,” that state would be “no longer free to manage 
their own affairs,” and the material restriction of a state’s control over their 
fiscal affairs was thus declared unconstitutional.165 
In response to Ashton, Congress enacted, and the Supreme Court upheld 
in United States v. Bekins,166 a revised Municipal Bankruptcy Act.167  In 
Bekins, the Court noted Congress was “especially solicitous” to ensure that 
the revised Act would “afford no ground for [constitutional] objection.”168  
During the legislative process, the House Judiciary Committee Report 
 
 157. See Hannah Heck, Solving Insolvent Public Pensions: The Limitations of the Current 
Bankruptcy Option, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 89, 98 (2011). 
 158. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 45 (1938). 
 159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 160. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 161. Francisco Vazquez, Examining Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy Cases, in CHAPTER 
9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES:  LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING 
PROCESS, COUNSELING MUNICIPALITIES, AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS AND CASES (Jo 
Alice Darden ed., 2011), available at 2011 WL 5053640, at *4. 
 162. See Chapter 9:  Municipality Bankruptcy, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter9.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).  
The Constitution expressly forbids states from enacting any “Law impairing the Obligation 
of Contracts.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Concurrently, however, the Tenth Amendment 
establishes limits on federal power by reserving the powers not delegated by the Constitution 
to the states, thus preserving state sovereignty. Id. amend. X. 
 163. 298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
 164. See id. at 532. 
 165. Id. at 531. 
 166. 304 U.S. 27 (1938). 
 167. See id. at 54. 
 168. Id. at 50. 
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stated the committee’s mindfulness of the Ashton holding, and its belief that 
the Revised Act was in compliance with the Ashton holding, noting: 
The bill here recommended for passage expressly avoids any restriction 
on the powers of the States or their arms of government in the exercise of 
their sovereign rights and duties.  No interference with the fiscal or 
governmental affairs of a political subdivision is permitted.  The taxing 
agency itself is the only instrumentality which can seek the benefits of the 
proposed legislation.  No involuntary proceedings are allowable, and no 
control or jurisdiction over that property and those revenues of the 
petitioning agency necessary for essential governmental purposes is 
conferred by the bill . . . .  There is no hope for relief through statutes 
enacted by the States, because the Constitution forbids the passing of 
State laws impairing the obligations of existing contracts. Therefore, relief 
must come from Congress, if at all. The committee [is] not prepared to 
admit that the situation presents a legislative no-man’s land.169 
The Senate Judiciary Committee adopted the House Committee Report.170  
The Supreme Court, when upholding the constitutionality of the Municipal 
Bankruptcy Act, noted that the statute was “carefully drawn so as not to 
impinge on the sovereignty of the State,” and that the power is exercised 
only when authorized by state law.171  The Court stated that the Tenth 
Amendment “protected, and did not destroy, [a state’s] right to make 
contracts and give consents.”172 
2.   The Municipal Bankruptcy Code Evolves 
For forty years, the Municipal Bankruptcy Act remained largely 
unchanged, until municipal financial developments in the 1970s, including 
New York City’s financial crisis in 1976, prompted Congress to amend the 
Municipal Bankruptcy Code.173  Before 1976, bankruptcy courts were 
required to find that the adjustment plan was “for the best interests of the 
creditors” and “fair and equitable” prior to confirmation.174  “Feasibility 
was embedded into the ‘fair and equitable’ requirement,” and courts were 
required to analyze projected expenditures and revenues, and make express 
findings whether it was probable that after adjustment, the debtor could pay 
the creditors’ claims.175  Courts understood that the “fair and equitable” 
requirement meant that a municipality had to generally demonstrate a 
balanced budget in a reasonable time period after adjustment 
confirmation.176  The 1976 revisions expressly required a feasibility 
determination but removed the fair and equitable requirement as redundant 
 
 169. Id. at 51. 
 170. See id. at 50. 
 171. See id. at 51. 
 172. See id. at 52. 
 173. See Heck, supra note 157, at 98 n.70. 
 174. In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 33 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999) (citing Act 
of June 28, 1940, ch. 438, 54 Stat. 667, 669–70 (1940); H.R. REP. NO. 94-686, at 32 (1975)). 
 175. See id. 
 176. See id. 
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with the best interests of creditors test.177  The best interest of creditors 
requirement of § 943(b)(7) is often easy to establish because creditors often 
have limited recourse outside of bankruptcy—they cannot propose a 
payment plan, cannot convert proceedings to a Chapter 7 liquidation, 
cannot appoint a trustee, and cannot force municipal asset sales.178  
Generally, a creditor’s only recourse if it fears the Chapter 9 debtor’s plan is 
to litigate for dismissal of the Chapter 9 petition.179  With limited leverage 
and other options, creditors may accept a Chapter 9 plan to avoid other non-
bankruptcy alternatives.180 
In 1988, Congress updated the definition of “insolvency” to the current 
cash flow definition, where the municipality must demonstrate its inability 
to pay bills as they become due.181  Chapter 9’s definition is in contrast 
with the Code’s definition of insolvency for non-municipality entities, 
which employs a balance sheet approach.182  Congress updated Chapter 9’s 
definition because a balance sheet methodology would result in most 
municipalities’ liabilities exceeding the value of its nonexempt assets, 
making many municipalities technically insolvent and thus eligible for 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy relief.183 
3.   Bankruptcy Courts’ Interpretation of Congressional Purpose 
The “purpose of chapter 9 is to temporarily protect a debtor from 
collection actions so that it may establish a repayment plan with its 
creditors.”184  Chapter 9 allows a municipality to preserve critical jobs and 
keep the municipal debtor economically viable.185  The statute is arranged 
to provide the debtor with a “breathing spell”—provided by the automatic 
stay provisions under §§ 922(a) and 362(a)—to adjust its debt.186  
However, the purpose of a Chapter 9 petition may not “simply be to buy 
time or evade creditors.”187  Other bankruptcy courts have noted that the 
court’s jurisdiction “should not be exercised lightly . . . in light of the 
interplay between Congress’ bankruptcy power and the limitations on 
 
 177. See id. at 33–34.  The “fair and equitable” requirement is now incorporated through 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(10)(b) in certain situations. Id. at 34. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See id. 
 180. See id.    
 181. See 5 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 155, § 90:5. 
 182. The balance sheet approach is defined as a “financial condition such that the sum of 
such entity’s debts is greater than all of such entity’s property, at a fair valuation.” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(32)(A) (2012). 
 183. See 1 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 155, § 17:8. 
 184. In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 280 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(citing In re Hamilton Creek Metro. Dist., 143 F.3d 1381, 1386 (10th Cir. 1998)). 
 185. See Judith Elkin, A “Time Out” for Municipalities:  The Recent Workings of Chapter 
9 of the Bankruptcy Code, in CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES, supra note 162, 
available at 2011 WL 5053638, at *1. 
 186. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 187 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (citing In re Cnty. 
of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 607 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995)). 
 187. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30, ¶ 900.02. 
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federal power under the Tenth Amendment,” and that access to Chapter 9 
was designed to be an “intentionally difficult task.”188 
4.   Eligibility Requirements and Limits 
Chapter 9 provides certain eligibility requirements to qualify for 
protections at the petition phase.189  Section 109(c) provides that “an entity 
may be a debtor under Chapter 9 of this title if and only if such entity[:]  
(1) is a municipality; (2) is specifically authorized . . . to be a debtor . . . by 
State law . . . ; (3) is insolvent; [and] (4) desires to effect a plan to adjust 
such debts.”190  Section 109 further provides that the debtor must either 
(A) have obtained an agreement of creditors holding a majority in amount 
of claims of each class, (B) have negotiated in good faith with creditors but 
failed to obtain an agreement of the majority in amount of the claims of 
each class, (C) be unable to negotiate with creditors because negotiation is 
impracticable, or (D) reasonably believe that a creditor may attempt to 
obtain a transfer that in avoidable under § 547.191  The petitioner bears the 
burden of proving—by a preponderance of the evidence—that the entity 
satisfies the eligibility criteria.192  Courts have held that § 109(c)’s 
eligibility requirements should be “construed broadly” to promote the 
underlying policies of the Bankruptcy Code—that is, to provide 
municipalities with the access to relief.193  The Bankruptcy Code requires 
that a municipality’s Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition must be submitted in 
good faith or the court may dismiss the petition altogether, denying any 
relief to the municipality.194 
Chapter 9 also provides that the debtor’s debt adjustment plan must 
conform to multiple statutory provisions to be eligible for confirmation by 
the court.195  The debtor remains in exclusive control over the proposed 
plan, subject to the requirements of § 943 and to confirmation by the 
court.196  However, the debtor carries the burden of proof for the 
confirmation plan requirements by a preponderance of the evidence.197  
 
 188. In re Sullivan Cnty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 82 (Bankr. D.N.H. 
1994); see also N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. at 264 (stating that eligibility 
should be determined with a “jaded eye” due to dual sovereignty concerns). 
 189. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id.; see also id. § 547.  Section 547 prevents transfer of property to or for the benefit 
of the creditor when certain statutory conditions are met. Id. 
 192. See, e.g., In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 794 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013). 
 193. In re Valley Health Sys., 383 B.R. 156, 163 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008); see also In re 
Barnwell Cnty. Hosp., 471 B.R. 849, 858–59 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2012); In re Pierce Cnty. Hous. 
Auth., 414 B.R. 702, 710 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009); In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 
601 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 194. 11 U.S.C. § 921(c). (“[T]he court, after notice and a hearing, may dismiss the 
petition if the debtor did not file the petition in good faith or if the petition does not meet the 
[statutory requirements].”). 
 195. See id. § 943. 
 196. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30, ¶ 941.02. 
 197. Allan H. Ickowitz & Robert S. McWhorter, Understanding the Unique Challenges of 
Chapter 9 Cases, in REPRESENTING CREDITORS, supra note 99, available at 2014 WL 
4785318, at *8. 
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Section 943(b)(1) requires that the plan comply with Code provisions made 
applicable by §§ 103(a) and 901(a).  Section 901(a) makes applicable the 
§ 1129(a)(3) requirement that the debt adjustment plan be proposed in good 
faith.198  Section 943(b)(7) requires that the plan be in the “best interest” of 
creditors, but courts have interpreted this simply to mean “better than the 
alternatives.”199  Chapter 9 also requires that the plan must not 
“discriminate unfairly” with respect to each class of claims and must be 
“fair and equitable.”200  With respect to unsecured claims, § 1129(b)(2) 
requires that either creditors receive a value equal to their claim or that no 
creditor whose claims are junior to the claims of a class receives or retains 
any property.201  However, case law shows varying interpretation of this 
language, and many plans have been confirmed where various unsecured 
bond obligations are classified separately from other unsecured creditors or 
even other unsecured bond obligations.202  Courts allow separate 
classification based on multiple criteria “including economic justifications, 
settling [versus] non-settling creditors, or other appropriate grounds.”203  At 
the confirmation stage, creditors can challenge the creditor class structure, 
since confirmation requires a majority vote of each class of creditors, and 
the classes may not be arbitrarily or coercively put together to provide 
disproportionate benefits to certain classes.204 
II.   CONFLICTING AND INCONSISTENT CHAPTER 9 
INTERPRETATIONS AND RESULTS 
Part II outlines the conflicting judicial interpretations of Chapter 9 
bankruptcy factors relating to eligibility for Chapter 9 relief and 
confirmation of the Chapter 9 exit plan.  The judicial interpretations create 
uncertainty for municipalities and creditors alike.  In particular, 
uncertainties in municipality treatment, asset usage, insolvency 
calculations, and good faith analysis cause problems for both debtors and 
creditors.205  Municipal debtors may face increased borrowing costs, 
contagion issues,206 and uncertain eligibility for relief, while creditors have 
limited recourse once the petition is accepted, as the municipal debtor can 
spend and borrow without court approval and bind creditors to a confirmed 
plan.207  With uncertain treatment on a case-by-case basis, there is room to 
clarify the application of Chapter 9 by differentiating between one-time and 
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 203. Id. 
 204. See Vazquez, supra note 161, at *6. 
 205. See generally Mark A. Cody, Creditors’ Rights in Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, in 
REPRESENTING CREDITORS, supra note 99, available at 2014 WL 4785319, at *1–2. 
 206. Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland / The Detroit Bankruptcy:  Why Debts 
Associated with Pensions, Benefits, and Municipal Securities Never Die . . . and How They 
Are Killing Cities Like Detroit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 816 (2014). 
 207. See In re Richmond Unified Sch. Dist., 133 B.R. 221, 224–25 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
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structurally imbalanced bankruptcies and providing context to key 
outcome-determinative factors. 
As discussed above, municipal bankruptcies generally fall into one of 
two categories:  one-time event bankruptcies or significant long-term 
structural imbalance bankruptcies.208  Part II.A describes the difference 
between the two types.   The current bankruptcy precedent does not employ 
guidelines to differentiate between the one-time event bankruptcy and long-
term structural imbalance bankruptcy, leading to inconsistent and uncertain 
results.  Part II analyzes this tension. 
When courts analyze the bankruptcy petition, they face several 
challenges.  First, municipalities have to receive specific authorization from 
the state to file for bankruptcy.209  Currently, courts simply examine 
whether a municipality is legally authorized to file.210  Municipalities with 
uncertainty as to their legal ability to file leave creditors only with notice of 
Chapter 9 generally, but without notice of whether a municipality is 
actually a municipality and whether a specific municipality will be 
authorized for a Chapter 9 filing.  During significant financial stress, there 
is much uncertainty as to how the state and municipality are going to act, 
thus increasing credit risk and borrowing costs for solvent municipalities 
because creditors are uncertain of Chapter 9 availability.211 
Second, municipal bankruptcy petitions authorize either current or 
prospective insolvency.212  Courts currently do not have a concrete rule for 
how far into the future is too far for a prospective analysis and utilize an ad 
hoc approach, which creates difficulties when determining eligibility.213  
Additionally, municipalities may have assets that are not recognized under a 
cash flow insolvency analysis but remain relevant to a municipality’s 
financial position.214  Without the ability to force liquidation of assets, the 
cash flow insolvency methodology potentially allows a city with significant 
nonessential assets to be cash flow insolvent, and thus file for Chapter 9, 
while maintaining the nonessential assets.  Potential assets are another 
issue.  Municipalities generally have taxing and assessment powers, and the 
question often arises in a bankruptcy proceeding—under the insolvency 
calculation and the good faith analysis—whether that ability has been 
reasonably deployed.215  Courts are split whether implementing taxes and 
 
 208. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text. 
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assessments is evidence of bad faith, with corresponding implications in the 
insolvency analysis.216  Differentiation of nonessential assets and potential 
assets seems to have significant relevance to one-time event bankruptcy 
since the debt is known and the question is simply whether the municipality 
can reasonably pay its bills. 
Finally, courts have to determine if a municipality’s petition and 
subsequent behavior are in good faith.  Good faith elements exist in every 
aspect of the bankruptcy—from the situations and conditions leading up to 
the petition, the accounting and projections, and the negotiations with the 
proper parties. 
A.   Bankruptcy Types:  The One-Offs and the Structurally Imbalanced 
This section examines one-time event municipal bankruptcies and 
structurally imbalanced municipal bankruptcies.  It first outlines a typical 
one-off bankruptcy which can be caused by one-time events such as a large 
adverse civil judgment, fiscal mismanagement behavior, or investment pool 
losses,217 using Jefferson County as an example.  It then describes a typical 
structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, using Detroit as an example. 
1.   One-Time Event Bankruptcy 
A one-time event bankruptcy is caused by a disproportionate financial 
stress occurring at a singular time that renders insolvent an otherwise 
seemingly solvent municipality.  As briefly outlined above, Jefferson 
County, notorious for the second largest municipal bankruptcy filing in U.S. 
history, exemplifies a quintessential one-time event bankruptcy.  Its 
bankruptcy petition resulted from the concurrence of invalidated state taxes 
and crushing debt from the reconstruction of the County’s neglected sewer 
system.218  The sewer debt was exacerbated by failed swap and interest rate 
stabilization agreements that converted fixed interest rates to adjustable 
rates while simultaneously utilizing a swap structure to control the 
adjustable rates.219  The sewer system’s financing was obtained in part by 
several agreements that involved bribery and fraud by multiple actors, 
including construction contractors, municipal financiers, and investment 
bankers.220  In evaluating the bankruptcy, the court suggested that the 
“[c]ounty’s inhabitants are in the midst of a perfect financial storm brought 
on by the convergence of prohibited, unethical and bad conduct by public 
and private persons and entities all while some were supposedly under the 
supervision of and regulation by state and federal agencies.”221  The perfect 
storm of events that causes “acute and immediate” financial crisis is 
 
 216. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra notes 7–9. 
 218. See In re Jefferson Cnty., 474 B.R. 228, 239 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012). 
 219. See id. at 237. 
 220. See id. at 239–40. 
 221. Id. at 240. 
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characteristic of a one-time event bankruptcy, and that storm generally 
happens with little prior notice.222 
2.   Structurally Imbalanced Bankruptcy 
A structurally imbalanced bankruptcy is caused by protracted financial 
stress created by structural conditions including shrinking population, loss 
of tax base, legacy pension costs, unfunded health care costs, poor 
management, and infrastructure costs.223  Cities like Detroit, a 
quintessential structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, display the difficulties of 
a municipality with significant financial imbalances emanating from 
multiple sources manifesting themselves over a significant time period.224  
Economic decline, population loss, and other structural factors reduced 
Detroit’s tax base.225  Detroit’s population has dropped a dramatic 63 
percent since the city’s mid-twentieth-century heyday, and has dropped 26 
percent in the new millennium.226  The per capita tax burden on residents 
and businesses has increased significantly, while the stresses from 
population loss, deindustrialization, and fiscal mismanagement left the city 
struggling to provide basic services—infrastructure (water, sewer, and 
roads), education, and safety services (fire, police, and emergency medical 
services)—for residents and businesses.227 
Detroit had massive debts:  $5.85 billion in special revenue bonds,228 
$6.4 billion in post-employment benefit liabilities, $3.5 billion in unfunded 
pension liabilities, $1.43 billion in pension certificates, $1.13 billion in 
secured and unsecured general obligation bonds, $296 million in swap 
liabilities, and $300 million in other liabilities.229  In 2013, debt service 
obligations represented 42.5 percent of Detroit’s yearly revenue, and by 
2017, debt service obligations are projected to rise to 65 percent of city 
revenues.230 
Detroit was unable to provide services to its constituents, a condition that 
some commentators and bankruptcy judges refer to as “service delivery 
insolvency.”231  Detroit has 78,000 abandoned or blighted structures and 
nearly 66,000 blighted lots.232  Half a century of economic difficulties and 
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mismanagement prevented Detroit from making critical investments, 
resulting in critical city departments, including police, fire, emergency 
medical services, being unable to adequately serve its population.233  
Detroit’s violent crime rates were five times the national averages and the 
case clearance rate234 is significantly below the national average.235 
Detroit’s average response time for top priority crimes was 58 minutes, 
over five times the national average.236  Forty percent of the city’s 
streetlights do not function.237  In 2009, Detroit closed 210 of its 317 parks, 
and it has announced an additional 50 park closings.238  The number of jobs 
in the city has declined 50 percent—from approximately 735,000 jobs in 
1970 to approximately 346,000 jobs in 2012.239  The unemployment rate 
has swiftly risen, from 6.3 percent in 2000 to 18.3 percent in 2012, with a 
peak of 23.4 percent in 2010.240  Detroit’s information technology, payroll, 
tax, and financial reporting systems are functionally obsolete.241 
Detroit’s revenues are also declining—income tax revenues declined to 
$276 million, 30 percent less than 2002, and property tax revenues declined 
10 percent, to $135 million, from 2012 to 2013 alone.242  Revenue from the 
utility user’s tax was $39.8 million in 2012, a 28 percent decrease from a 
decade ago.243  Concurrently, the city had operating deficits—$115 million 
in 2012 alone.244 
Detroit’s income tax rates of 2.4 percent for residents and 2.0 percent for 
businesses are the highest in the state.245  Detroit’s property tax rates are the 
highest among Michigan cities with populations exceeding 50,000.246  
Income and property taxes are levied at Michigan’s statutory maximum, 
prohibiting Detroit from possibly raising additional revenue through 
increased taxation.247  A 5 percent utility user’s tax, levied on utility 
services, is also set at the statutory maximum.248  The city also has a 10.9 
percent casino tax that generates approximately $175 million, but new 
casinos in Ohio are expected to erode these tax receipts.249 
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Detroit is a classic, but not the only, structurally imbalanced bankruptcy.  
Other structurally imbalanced bankruptcies include Stockton and Vallejo, 
cities afflicted by a combination of legacy liabilities, deindustrialization, 
fiscal mismanagement, and reduced tax revenue, which manifest themselves 
over a period of time to create major financial stress.250 
B.   Is It a Municipality—And Authorized for Bankruptcy? 
Public entities, creditors, and rating agencies alike can be uncertain in the 
two-step process of whether an entity is a “municipality” and if so, whether 
that municipality is specifically authorized to petition for bankruptcy.  Pre-
lending notice is relevant to the creditor’s ability to understand the risk 
when providing credit to an entity.251  The first issue is whether the entity is 
a municipality at all.252  Sophisticated creditors of cities and counties are 
very likely aware that the entity is a municipality.253  However, with respect 
to housing authorities, power plants, toll roads, and the like, a creditor may 
be uncertain of the municipality’s status.254  A creditor then has to examine 
the factors outlined above, including the amount of public control over an 
entity, the entity’s taxing and assessment power, and the state’s statutory 
classification of the entity.255  With creditor uncertainty of a municipality’s 
status, credit risk can rise, making it more difficult to issue debt and 
increasing the cost of servicing the debt.256 
Further, the Bankruptcy Code requires that a municipality be specifically 
authorized by the state to file for bankruptcy.257  Currently, the Code does 
not contain a provision requiring a state to predetermine a municipality’s 
specific authorization status for Chapter 9 prior to financial crisis.258  
Certain states provide wide statutory authority for their municipalities to 
petition for Chapter 9 relief.259  However, not every state grants its 
municipalities authorization to access Chapter 9.260  Twenty-six states 
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prohibit Chapter 9 filing, and if a municipality wants access to Chapter 9 in 
those states, it would have to petition the state legislature to change the 
law.261  Other states, such as Connecticut, allow the filing but require 
“secondary special permission,” usually from the governor or legislature.262  
Thus there is uncertainty from both the creditor’s and municipality’s 
standpoint regarding whether a municipality will be specifically authorized 
for filing. 
The current rules also allow a state to authorize filing or disallow filing at 
any time prior to a Chapter 9 petition.263  In one-time event bankruptcies, 
the lack of clarity of specific authorization eliminates all notice of the 
availability of Chapter 9.  Municipalities and creditors alike are forced to 
operate with the backdrop of federal bankruptcy law, without knowing in 
many instances if the state will provide specific authorization.264 
In structural imbalance bankruptcies, municipalities and creditors have 
more notice of financial struggles but still may be uncertain of the 
availability of Chapter 9, for the same reasons as one-time event 
bankruptcies.265  The Code only requires specific authorization from the 
state, but that authorization can come any time prior to the filing, including 
just before the filing.266  In this situation, the creditor will not know 
whether the municipality will have specific authorization from the state to 
file, but the creditor must operate with the backdrop that a Chapter 9 
petition is possible. 
C.   Measuring “Insolvency” 
Multiple variables play into the Chapter 9 insolvency calculation.  This 
section details the insolvency requirement, beginning with the accounting 
methodology, and then illustrates how a municipality can demonstrate 
insolvency using either a current or prospective calculation.  Finally, this 
section describes the tension between creditors and debtors regarding the 
inclusion of nonessential assets and potential assets in an insolvency 
calculation. 
1.   Current or Prospective, and If So, How Far? 
Insolvency is measured differently in different sections of the Bankruptcy 
Code.267  Unlike a business in Chapter 11, a municipality must be insolvent 
to be eligible for Chapter 9 protection.268  In contrast to Chapter 11’s 
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balance sheet insolvency method,269 Chapter 9 uses a cash flow analysis, 
where, to be considered insolvent, a municipality must demonstrate that it is 
generally not paying, or will be unable to pay, debts as they become due.270  
Chapter 9 requires that insolvency be “real and not transitory,” such that the 
municipality is in “bona fide financial distress that is not likely to be 
resolved without use of federal bankruptcy power to impair contracts.”271 
The “will not be able to pay” insolvency test is a prospective standard, 
thereby allowing a municipality to seek protection prior to running out of 
money.272  The Code does not provide a methodology for prospective 
insolvency determination, leaving courts to analyze prospective insolvency 
on a case-by-case basis.273 
The date of filing currently serves as a reference for the insolvency 
analysis based on precedent originating from In re City of Bridgeport,274 as 
debts may fluctuate depending on the financial stressors that precipitated 
the filing.275  In Bridgeport, the judge noted that “neither § 101(32)(C)(ii) 
nor its legislative history provide guidance on how far into the future [the 
insolvency analysis] should go.”276  In 2012, the Stockton proceedings 
confirmed “how far one looks into the future to discern insolvency has not 
been settled.”277 
Clearly, the further the projection is into the future, the less accurate it 
will be.  In Bridgeport, the court identified many of the variables affecting a 
municipality’s fiscal condition, including the health of the local, national, 
and international economy; state and federal aid; labor concessions; 
voluntary tax abatements; tax increases; tax collection rates, and the success 
of borrowing attempts.278  The court ultimately dismissed the Chapter 9 
petition, holding that the city had not demonstrated insolvency because of 
the uncertainty in the city’s projected budget deficit and cash position.279  
Bridgeport is representative of problems with projected insolvency, where a 
city is attempting to protect assets but is uncertain whether it will qualify as 
insolvent without more definitive statutory guidance or consistent precedent 
from the courts. 
Additionally, Chapter 9’s cash flow insolvency analysis essentially 
ignores asset valuation, including nonessential assets as discussed below.  
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 271. See In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 773 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013). 
 272. See In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 336 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991). 
 273. See id. at 337. 
 274. 129 B.R. 332 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991). 
 275. See id. at 337–38. 
 276. See id. at 337. 
 277. See In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 788 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013). 
 278. See Bridgeport, 129 B.R. at 338. 
 279. See id. at 339.  The Bridgeport government had not approved next year’s budget at 
the time of the petition, compounding the uncertainty. Id. 
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2.   Nontraditional Asset Classes and Potential Assets 
Part II.C.1 outlined how bankruptcy courts apply cash-flow methodology 
to determine whether a municipality is either currently or prospectively cash 
flow insolvent.280  The cash flow analysis could allow a city with 
significant nonessential assets to be considered insolvent, and thus file for 
Chapter 9, while maintaining those assets.281  Currently, § 904 prevents 
courts from interfering with the debtor’s political or governmental powers, 
property or revenues, or the use or enjoyment of any income-producing 
property.282  Unlike Chapter 11, Chapter 9 does not provide any provision 
for liquidation of the debtor’s assets or distribution of those assets to 
creditors.283  Section 903 explicitly provides that the Bankruptcy Code does 
not limit or impair the state’s power to control its municipalities.284 
Detroit has an interesting asset situation.  The Detroit Institute of Art 
(DIA) is owned by the city and currently houses 65,000 works of art that 
are collectively considered one of the most prominent art museums in the 
United States.285  Detroit owns a “significant portion” of the DIA 
Collection, which was acquired in three ways:  (1) a 1919 asset transfer,286 
(2) art that was purchased by the city, and (3) art donated to the city after 
the asset transfer.287  In 1930, with the city’s collection growing to 12,000 
works, the city financed and constructed the current museum building.288 
In anticipation of its Chapter 9 proceedings, Detroit retained Christie’s to 
appraise the fair market value of the artwork that Detroit acquired using city 
funds.289  The appraisal consisted of 2781 works, with a total appraisal 
value of $454 million to $866 million.290  Christie’s classified 406 of the 
appraised items as “most valuable works”—items with individual values 
greater than $50,000—and noted that the most valuable works represented 
more than 99 percent of the total appraisal value.291  Interestingly, eleven of 
the appraised works represented 75 percent of the total estimated value, and 
just three represented more than half the value:  Pieter Bruegel the Elder’s 
The Wedding Dance ($100–$200 million), Vincent Van Gogh’s Self 
 
 280. 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 45 (2015). 
 281. See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 282. See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012). 
 283. Chapter 9:  Municipality Bankruptcy, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter9.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). 
 284. See 11 U.S.C. § 903. 
 285. See Detroit Disclosure Statement, supra note 226, at 26. 
 286. From 1885 to 1919, the museum was a separate corporation, but in 1919 the museum 
transferred ownership of the 4400 works of art, along with the property and original museum 
structure, to the City of Detroit pursuant to Michigan Public Law and the Detroit City 
Charter. Id.  The transferor-corporation remained in existence after the transfer, contracting 
with Detroit to operate the museum. Id. 
 287. See id. 
 288. See id. 
 289. See id. 
 290. See id. at 75.  The smaller number denotes a conservative price and the higher 
number represents the most advantageous estimate. 
 291. Id. 
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Portrait with Straw Hat ($80–$150 million), and Rembrandt’s The 
Visitation ($50–$90 million).292 
Christie’s report recommended several options that the city could use to 
generate revenue from the collection absent selling any of the artwork, 
including (1) pledging some or all of the art as collateral for a loan, 
(2) generating revenue by leasing the masterpieces to other art museums, 
(3) creating a “masterpiece trust,”293 (4) selling artwork to a philanthropist 
or charity on the condition that they permanently lend the work to the 
Detroit Institute of Art, or (5) mounting a travelling exhibition of 
masterpiece works.294 
Multiple creditors, including Syncora Guarantee Inc. and Financial 
Guarantee Insurance Company (FGIC), contended that the city should be 
required to monetize its nonessential assets or receive loans to pay off 
creditors that are secured by art assets, which Detroit opposes.295  Detroit’s 
position was that any art sale would irreparably harm the DIA and that the 
options to generate revenue while retaining title were not viable.296 
In 2014, during the confirmation phase of the bankruptcy proceedings, 
the City of Detroit and the Detroit Art Institute commissioned Artvest 
Partners to perform a complete appraisal of the entire collection, 
irrespective of the title acquiring method.  Artvest’s appraisal returned an 
estimate range between $2.76 billion and $4.61 billion.297  However, 
Artvest’s report identified a series of additional factors that it considered 
likely to reduce the generated revenue, including unsold rates, the impact of 
immediate liquidation, or alternatively a “blockage discount”—a reduction 
in sale price when selling a large group of similar items—and issues with a 
large offering with the main art auction houses.298  Artvest also noted legal 
obstacles and corresponding litigation of the asset sales that may cloud the 
title and prevent the receipt of more than the deposit.299  Based on those 
discount factors, Artvest estimated that the collection would sell for “$1.1 
billion for the present value of an orderly sale after a prolonged 
litigation . . . to $1.8 billion for the present value of an orderly liquidation 
without litigation.”300  Further, it countered each of Christie’s monetization 
suggestions, generally concluding that the solutions were not viable.301  
Artvest’s report concluded “[r]ather than being a source of cash to creditors 
 
 292. Id. 
 293. See id.  This unprecedented arrangement would transfer city-owned art into a trust, 
with minority trust interest sold to individual museums, entitling them to borrow works for 
finite predetermined amounts of time. Id. 
 294. See id. 
 295. Khalil AlHajal, Opening Argument in Detroit Bankruptcy Trial:  Selling Art, Raising 
Taxes Aren’t Reasonable Options, MLIVE (Sept. 3, 2014, 8:33 AM), http://www.mlive.com 
/news/detroit/index.ssf/2014/09/opening_argument_in_detroit_ba.html. 
 296. See infra note 307 and accompanying text. 
 297. ARTVEST, EXPERT WITNESS REPORT OF MICHAEL PLUMMER 19 (2014), available at 
http://archive.freep.com/assets/freep/pdf/C422218479.pdf. 
 298. Id. at 26–30. 
 299. See id. at 31–32. 
 300. Id. at 37. 
 301. See id. at 42–47. 
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or a burden on the current city, in fact the DIA is the single most important 
cultural asset the City currently owns for rebuilding the vitality of the 
city.”302 
The creditors extrapolated the value of the Christie’s appraisal to imply 
that the residual 95 percent of the collection303 could be valued from “$11 
billion to as much as $21 billion.”304  That report indicated that “instead of 
continuing to burden Detroiters, a DIA de-accessioning offers the potential 
for asset value realization that the City might use to consensually satisfy 
creditor claims while liberating . . . reinvestment [capital]” to utilize for city 
rehabilitation.305 
The use of nonessential assets, such as art, particularly when the value is 
substantial compared to the budget deficit, is relevant in both the insolvency 
analysis and the confirmation phase “fair and equitable” analysis.  In 
Detroit’s confirmation proceedings, Judge Rhodes asked Detroit’s 
emergency manager, “Why not monetize the art?”306  The emergency 
manager responded that he believed that selling the art would “harm [the 
DIA] irreparably.”307  While Chapter 9 does not require the city to sell 
assets, the nonessential assets are considered by applying the good faith 
requirement to the insolvency analysis discussed in Part II.C and the good 
faith analysis discussed in Part II.D. This is particularly relevant in a 
situation like Detroit’s, where Detroit’s 2013 budget deficit of $125 million 
was less than the average appraisal value of Pieter Bruegel the Elder’s The 
Wedding Dance ($100–200 million).308 
While the Detroit bankruptcy is perhaps the most interesting case 
involving assets in a Chapter 9 proceeding, other cases have also examined 
the assets of a municipality and how their use relates to the various issues in 
a bankruptcy petition.  In In re Pierce County Housing Authority,309 the 
court addressed the creditor’s argument that the Housing Authority was not 
insolvent because it had assets consisting of fourteen buildings and other 
equipment worth approximately $44 million as of the petition date.310  
Pierce County involved a one-time event bankruptcy, where tort liability 
from a class of plaintiffs claiming damage from mold at one of defendant’s 
 
 302. Id. at 48. 
 303. Christie’s appraised 2726 of the 65,000 pieces, or approximately 5 percent, of the 
artwork. See supra notes 285–90 and accompanying text. 
 304. Motion of Creditors for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Section 105(a) of the 
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 305. See id. at *5. 
 306. Nathan Bomey, Detroit Bankruptcy Judge: ‘Why Not Monetize the Art?’ USA 
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 310. Id. at 711. 
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affordable housing facilities precipitated the Chapter 11 filing.311  However, 
the court found that thirteen of the fourteen buildings were subject to liens, 
and the debtor could not increase rents to generate revenue because of state 
law restrictions.312 
In In re City of Vallejo, unions challenged Vallejo’s petition by asserting, 
among other things, that the city’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 
(CAFR) reflected total assets of $1 billion and $624 million of net assets in 
excess of liabilities.313  Vallejo held its unrestricted assets in a general fund 
account that it used to bridge deficits in different accounts.314  However, the 
general fund recorded multimillion dollar deficits in the prior three years—
as a result, the general fund was depleted, and a projected deficit of $17 
million was projected for 2007–2008, with labor costs alone exceeding 
revenues.315  State law prevented the general fund from borrowing from 
restricted accounts without demonstrating a balanced budget and the ability 
to repay the restricted fund within a year.316  The union objectors advanced 
an argument that Vallejo was not insolvent, and the city should have 
“pillaged all of its component agency funds, ignor[ed] bond covenants, 
grant restrictions, and normal [accounting] practices . . .  to subsidize its 
General Fund.”317  While the bankruptcy appellate panel318 noted that the 
city “cannot squirrel away money it can use for operations in a fund, argue 
the fund is restricted and then claim insolvency,”319 the court held that 
using restricted funds was impermissible and that the union’s other 
suggestions, including an offer that would prevent bankruptcy this year but 
apply “onerous” terms in future years, would “leave Vallejo more 
debilitated tomorrow than it is today,” as restricted funds would be 
exhausted while revenues plunged and expenses surged.320  The appellate 
court thus held that the bankruptcy court’s insolvency findings were 
“supported by the record.”321 
In contrast, In re Ellicott School Building Authority, the court found that 
the building authority had not satisfied its burden in demonstrating 
insolvency, where the entity had alternative sources to successfully make its 
debt payments, including reserve funds and a defaulted rent payment.322  
 
 311. See id. at 706–08. 
 312. See id. at 711–12. 
 313. In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 280, 285 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009).  Vallejo was a 
structural bankruptcy—revenue was steadily declining and labor and expenses were rising, 
leading to an unstainable economic condition. 
 314. See id. at 286. 
 315. See id. 
 316. See id. 
 317. See id. at 290–91. 
 318. Bankruptcy appellate panels are three-judge panels that hear bankruptcy appeals.  
The panels are part of the federal appellate court system.  See Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 
U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Court 
ofAppeals/BankruptcyAppellatePanels.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). 
 319. See Vallejo, 408 B.R. at 290. 
 320. See id. at 293–94. 
 321. See id. at 294.  The court noted that a bankruptcy court’s findings are reviewed only 
for “clear error.” Id. 
 322. Ellicott Sch. Bldg. Auth., 150 B.R. 261, 265 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992). 
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Specifically, the authority did not show that it was unable to collect the 
defaulted rent payments that it was owed, and it had sufficient reserve funds 
to make the payment.323 
In In re City of Stockton, the bankruptcy court considered the debtor 
municipality’s failure to go to voters with tax increases under a creditor’s 
insolvency objection rather than a bad faith objection.324  The court found 
that Stockton was service delivery insolvent, and that while cash insolvency 
is the controlling Chapter 9 criterion for insolvency, the “degree of inability 
to fund essential government services” is relevant to the assessment of 
degree and duration of that insolvency, and evidence that the insolvency is 
not of a “mere technical insolvency.”325  The court held that failure to place 
a tax increase on the ballot is not persuasive of solvency, noting, “[p]utting 
the fiscal house in order so that voters might be willing to entertain tax 
increases is the whole point of chapter 9.”326 
Boise County’s bankruptcy petition, a one-time event bankruptcy caused 
by an adverse tort judgment,327 was dismissed because the bankruptcy court 
held that Boise had not established insolvency per § 101(32)(C)(ii).328  
Boise conceded that it was paying all debts as they became due,329 but filed 
a Chapter 9 petition when it became fearful that the tort creditor would 
execute on the county’s accounts and thus interfere with county 
operations.330  The petition listed assets of $27.7 million and liabilities of 
$7.3 million, including the judgment and litigation fees.331  Boise County 
had $2.05 million in unrestricted “trust accounts” and nearly $10 million in 
cash and investments in a series of restricted accounts.332 
Further, while Idaho law generally prohibited expenditures exceeding the 
adopted budget, it allowed Boise to issue registered warrants paid by tax 
increases to “meet mandatory expenditures required by law.”333  The court 
held that among the unrestricted trust accounts, the surplus restricted 
accounts, and the ability to issue warrants, that Boise had sufficient funds to 
pay the judgment, and had not established insolvency under 
§ 101(32)(C)(ii).334 
These examples demonstrate that the courts take a fact intensive 
approach when determining what role the utilization of nonessential and 
potential assets should play in the insolvency calculation.  Thus, because 
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 332. Id. at 164.  The court also found that the county had not established that surplus 
funds in the restricted accounts were inaccessible. See id. at 180. 
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compelled utilization of certain assets may be precluded by statutory law 
and insolvency results are largely fact dependent, a municipality’s good 
faith plays an important role in bankruptcy eligibility and plan 
confirmation. 
D.   Good Faith 
Chapter 9 requires good faith at both the petition phase and the 
confirmation phase.  The Bankruptcy Code requires that a municipality’s 
petition be submitted in good faith or the court may dismiss the petition 
altogether.335  The purpose of the statutory good faith requirement is to 
prevent manipulation and abuse of the process.336  However, courts have 
interpreted this power to be permissive, not mandatory, providing the court 
with a great deal of discretion as the gatekeeper for Chapter 9 
proceedings.337  Congress, in both the enacted statute and the legislative 
history, was silent on the definition of good faith, leaving the meaning of 
good faith in this context to be interpreted by the courts.338  Courts have 
interpreted the good faith requirement to “preserve the protection of the 
Code for those which it was actually intended,”339 and accordingly have 
developed a series of factors that may be considered in the good faith 
analysis.340 
In New York City Off-Track Betting Corp.,341 the court applied a series of 
factors derived from Collier on Bankruptcy to analyze a municipality’s 
good faith, including:  a municipality’s subjective beliefs; the scope and 
nature of municipality’s financial distress; the ability to address the 
municipality’s financial distress under Chapter 9; the municipality’s 
motivation for filing Chapter 9; the municipality’s pre-petition negotiations 
with creditors; and alternatives to Chapter 9.342  The court also looked to 
Chapter 11 appellate precedent to determine factors that indicate bad 
faith.343  Courts in other circuits also utilize Chapter 11 appellate precedent 
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for good faith analysis, including the Ninth Circuit which employs a 
“‘totality-of-the-circumstances’ analysis,” and “determine[s] a debtor's 
good faith on a case-by case basis, taking into account the particular 
features of each plan.”344 
1.   Good Faith at the Petition Phase 
Courts have rejected municipal bankruptcy filings at the petition phase 
on the grounds of bad faith.  In In re Sullivan County Regional Refuse 
Disposal District, the municipal debtors owed payments to a private 
incinerator stemming from a joint venture agreement between the 
municipality and the private facility operator.345  The debtors did not 
attempt to exercise their pre-bankruptcy assessment powers to require their 
constituents to meet the burgeoning debt.346  The bankruptcy court noted 
that the “hurdles to Chapter 9 were undoubtedly designed to prevent [] 
‘capricious filing,’” and held that municipalities petitioning for Chapter 9 
must, at a minimum, demonstrate that they used their taxing and assessment 
powers to a “reasonable extent, or in their pre-petition negotiations have 
committed to the use of those powers as part of a comprehensive and 
appropriate work out of their financial problems.”347 
Other bankruptcy courts have declined to invoke this type of mandate.  In 
In re McCurtain Municipal Authority,348 the debtor, a water service 
provider in a small rural town, owed the contractor of its waste water 
system monies from a state court judgment regarding disputed payments at 
the end of the construction contract.349  The debtor’s Chapter 9 petition was 
challenged by the creditor on grounds that the debtor had unrestricted cash 
and grant money, and had failed to assess citizens or impose higher rates 
even though it had the authority to do so.350  The court found that the failure 
to exercise that authority did not necessarily indicate bad faith, relying on 
evidence that rates were higher than in surrounding areas and that the area 
was low-income, and thus it was unlikely that imposing higher rates would 
have generated sufficient funds to cover the debt.351 
In Detroit’s petition phase, creditors challenged the filing on the grounds 
that the city did not act in good faith.352  Objectors argued that Detroit’s 
filing was a culmination of city and state efforts to impair pension rights 
through a bankruptcy filing, by reducing state revenue sharing, suppressing 
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information about the city’s valuable assets, and concealing the objective of 
state laws passed shortly prior to the bankruptcy petition.353  The court 
acknowledged that “many people in Detroit hold to this narrative,” and 
noted that some evidence that supported this view, including a pitch from a 
leading law firm on a roadmap to Chapter 9.354  The pitch included the idea 
of “establishing a good faith record of negotiations,” using an emergency 
manager for “political cover,” and warning against pre-petition asset 
monetization to insure insolvency.355 
The court ultimately held that Detroit’s filing was in good faith, noting 
that the financial problems are the “type contemplated for chapter 9 relief,” 
the reasons are consistent with the purpose of Chapter 9, the city made 
efforts to improve its finances, and city residents would be severely 
prejudiced if the case was dismissed.356  The court noted that of paramount 
importance was that the residents would be “severely prejudiced,” while 
referencing the fact that the city’s accelerating debt service obligations 
would utilize 65 percent of the city’s budget by 2017.357 
2.   Good Faith at the Confirmation Phase 
Good faith issues also arise at the confirmation stage.358  Section 1129 
requires that for confirmation of a plan, the plan must have “been proposed 
in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.”359  Section 
1129(b)(2) requires that a plan be “fair and equitable” with respect to each 
class of creditors.360  Thus, good faith is implicated when reviewing an 
adjustment plan for unfair discrimination that arises when “providing 
materially disparate treatment to two classes of bonds having substantially 
similar legal rights.”361 
In In re Mount Carbon Metropolitan District,362 the court held that the 
debt adjustment plan was not proposed in good faith, where the plan 
ignored the municipality’s current and future obligation to provide public 
services to its constituents.363  The debt adjustment plan had included full 
payment over forty years, but had effectively transferred the municipality’s 
taxing powers to a landowner, which “unfairly favored” itself and 
disadvantaged the others, and thus the plan fell “outside the policy and 
purpose of Chapter 9.”364 
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While not couched in terms of “good faith” per se, the court in Stockton 
reviewed the confirmation plan for unfair discrimination between creditor 
classes.365  The bankruptcy judge confirmed Stockton’s plan to exit 
bankruptcy.366  Stockton, as with all municipalities that reorganized in 
Chapter 9, had a significant amount of control over the proposed debt 
adjustment plan.367  Stockton’s proposal allocated to several bond creditors 
pennies on the dollar, while leaving the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS) contribution untouched.368  Moody’s 
Investor Service commented that Stockton’s “[p]roposed recovery rates for 
lease revenue and other general-fund supported bonds range from [1 percent 
to 100 percent] . . . [and] [b]etween these two extremes, holders of pension 
obligation bonds, which are secured by a bare contractual repayment 
obligation, would see a 50 [percent] recovery.”369  Moody’s noted that the 
exit plan proposal may “deviate from what the bankruptcy code provides 
for certain classes of debt.”370 
Creditors—including two Franklin Municipal Bond Mutual Funds 
(“Franklin”)—argued that the city failed to provide Franklin a reasonable 
recovery, focusing on, among other things, the city’s refusal to confront 
pension obligation issues.371  Franklin argued that Stockton lacked good 
faith as the plan provided combined recoveries of over 70 percent to retirees 
while proposing that Franklin receive one quarter of one percent.372  
Further, Franklin argued that the exit plan unfairly discriminated by 
providing similarly situated unsecured creditors with disproportionate 
recoveries.373 
Franklin noted that in the pre-bankruptcy neutral evaluation, the city 
proposed to use public facility fees (PFFs) to pay off 54.5 percent of the 
Franklin debt.374  At that time, the city apparently recognized that its failure 
to maximize available PFFs for Franklin would be “a sign of bad faith.”375  
Franklin also argued that Stockton’s “wholesale assumption of its single 
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largest liability—unfunded pensions—further evidence[d] that the Plan 
lack[ed] the good faith basis necessary for confirmation.”376  Franklin noted 
that, if the city was truly interested in “treat[ing] all interested parties fairly” 
and “provid[ing] creditors the potential for the greatest economic return 
from its assets,” it would have addressed its pension problem.377 
Finally, Franklin contended that the city disregarded Vallejo’s 
bankruptcy confirmation—another town on the San Francisco Bay—where 
long-term obligations were not sufficiently modified to reduce fiscal 
imbalance.378  The Stockton court approved Stockton’s plan, with the judge 
stating, “I’ve looked long and hard at this case and the responses that have 
been made, including the alternative of putting the whole situation back to 
Square 1, which is what would be required” if he rejected Stockton’s 
plan.379  In his ruling, the judge noted that some concessions were made 
with respect to legacy benefits, including the cancellation of the retiree 
health plan.380 
In Detroit’s adjustment plan, the city, the state, and certain creditors 
negotiated a “Grand Bargain”—an agreement that raises approximately 
$816 million over twenty years from foundations, the DIA, and the State of 
Michigan.381  The Grand Bargain allocates the funds towards Detroit’s 
pension obligations and transfers ownership of the DIA to an independent 
nonprofit.382  The agreement was contingent on votes from pensioners and 
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other creditors,383 and on July 11, 2014, the pensioner classes voted yes, 
while the secured and unsecured creditors voted no.384 
The largest opponents of the Grand Bargain were bond insurers, 
including FGIC and Syncora, which control $1.4 billion in pension 
certificate debt.385  The creditors challenged, among other things, that the 
plan was not “legal, fair and feasible,” in that it unfairly discriminated 
against the bond creditors in favor of the pension creditors.386  Eventually, 
Syncora agreed on a settlement that included $25 million, a thirty-year 
parking garage lease, and other benefits.387  After a series of court-
mandated mediation sessions, FGIC agreed to settle for 13 cents on the 
dollar and the rights to develop a new mixed-use complex in downtown 
Detroit.388  Two other dissenting classes, including civil claimants and 
rejected contract and lease claims, opposed confirmation to the end.389 
In November 2014, Judge Rhodes ruled on the adjustment plan, noting 
that “whether discrimination is unfair turns on ‘matters of conscience,’ 
informed by factors such as the [congressional] purpose of municipal 
bankruptcy and the judge’s ‘experience, education and sense of 
morality.’”390  The judge stated that the city’s treatment of the pension 
claimants “demonstrated a substantial mission-related justification” by 
attempting to preserve relationships with employees and maintain their 
motivation.391  With respect to the dissenting classes, Judge Rhodes found 
no similar justification.392  The court concluded that if each settlement 
within a plan is reasonable, “then the resulting discrimination in the plan 
must be fair.”393 
Commentators worry that the “[unfair discrimination] test’s reliance on 
settlement could write unfair discrimination out of the statute altogether.”394  
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Further, with the focus on accepting classes rather than dissenting classes, it 
is easy to apply, but if one focuses on involuntary creditors—those with tort 
or civil rights claims—it is more difficult to understand what their 
“reasonable expectations” were.395 
E.   The Problem with the Current Structure for Both Debtors and Creditors 
The uncertainties in municipality treatment, asset usage, insolvency 
calculations, and the method in which good faith is applied to analyze the 
proceedings cause problems for both debtors and creditors.  For municipal 
debtors, increased borrowing costs, contagion issues, and uncertain 
eligibility for relief are detrimental. 
Creditors have limited recourse once the petition is accepted, as the 
municipality can spend and borrow without court approval while not being 
subject to the reporting or other general duties of the Chapter 11 debtor.396  
A municipality is able to propose and bind all creditors to a confirmed plan, 
while avoiding “preferences, fraudulent conveyances and other 
transfers.”397  With uncertain treatment on a case-by-case basis, there is 
additional room to clarify the application of Chapter 9 by differentiating 
between one-time event and structurally imbalanced bankruptcies. 
III.   CLARIFYING CHAPTER 9 
Part III proposes a new multipart test for analyzing whether a 
municipality meets the statutory conditions required for Chapter 9 
municipal bankruptcy.  The test entails four factors to apply to the two main 
types of municipal bankruptcy:  one-time events and significant long-term 
structural imbalance bankruptcy.  One time bankruptcies, including Ellicott 
School District, Pierce County Housing Authority, Sullivan County 
Regional Refuse, Jefferson County, Orange County, and Boise County, 
should be analyzed under a different framework than Detroit, Stockton, and 
Vallejo—their structural imbalance counterparts.  The four factors weigh 
(1) whether the petition is prospective or current; (2) whether creditors had 
notice of specific authorization; (3) whether the debtor utilized available 
assets pre-petition; and (4) whether the debtor acted in good faith.  Good 
faith has two related prongs, the good faith of the debtor at the petition 
phase and maintenance of that good faith in the confirmation phase.  Part III 
evaluates how the four factors apply in the context of a one-time event 
bankruptcy and a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy. 
A.   The “Municipality” and “Eligibility” Certainty Factor 
The first factor that bankruptcy courts always have to consider is whether 
the entity is a municipality that is specifically authorized for Chapter 9 
bankruptcy.398  This factor is most relevant in the context of a one-time 
 
 395. See id. 
 396. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 397. In re Richmond Unified Sch. Dist., 133 B.R. 221, 224 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 398. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
2746 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
event bankruptcy.  One-time event bankruptcies generally run the entire 
gamut of cities, counties, and towns all the way to infrastructure entities, 
hospitals, and housing authorities.399  For special purpose municipalities—
infrastructure entities, hospitals, and housing authorities—it is often more 
questionable whether the entity is a municipality for the purposes of 
Chapter 9.400  Uncertainty as to whether an entity is a municipality further 
increases uncertainty as to whether that entity will be specifically 
authorized to utilize Chapter 9.  When evaluating a bankruptcy petition and 
confirmation plan in a one-time event bankruptcy, courts should consider 
whether the state specifically authorized Chapter 9 for all municipalities, 
whether that authorization was contingent on additional state action, and the 
timing of authorization, i.e., whether the state authorized the Chapter 9 
petition right before the filing without previously authorizing Chapter 9 
filings in any capacity.401  The less notice the creditor had with respect to 
the ability for a municipality to utilize Chapter 9, the more critically the 
court should examine whether the municipality acted in good faith in the 
petition and confirmation stage. 
Structurally imbalanced municipalities are generally cities or counties, 
and thus there is more certainty that the entity qualifies as a municipality for 
Chapter 9.  The court can immediately move to evaluate the level of notice 
that a state’s laws provided creditors.  As with one-time event bankruptcies, 
the less notice of Chapter 9 eligibility a creditor has, the more critically the 
bankruptcy court should review whether the municipality acted in good 
faith in the petition and at the confirmation stage. 
Finally, Congress could consider adding a requirement that states identify 
whether an entity is a municipality specifically authorized for Chapter 9 
prior to a certain date.  A statute requiring states to classify their 
municipalities prior to a certain date would likely be upheld if challenged 
under the Tenth Amendment.  The state retains complete control over the 
authorization decision, and the state could still revoke the authorization at 
any time, which is likely beneficial from a creditor’s standpoint.  While a 
congressional mandate would impose initial compliance costs for states, 
this mechanism would provide municipalities and creditors with clarity 
regarding an entity’s Chapter 9 eligibility. 
B.   The Insolvency Factors 
Calculating insolvency is of critical importance to Chapter 9.  First, this 
section discusses current insolvency versus prospective insolvency and 
suggests that there are certain situations where courts should permit 
prospective insolvency petitions and other situations where the court likely 
should permit only current insolvency petitions.  Next, this section suggests 
that utilization of nonessential assets and potential assets should be 
considered heavily in one-time event bankruptcies.  Lastly, it argues that 
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utilization of potential assets is less important in structurally imbalanced 
bankruptcies, and that utilization of nonessential assets should be 
considered in the insolvency calculation if those assets can overcome a 
substantial portion of the structural imbalance. 
1.   Current Insolvency, Prospective Insolvency, or Both? 
In a one-time event bankruptcy, the debts of an entity are generally 
known and the real question is how to measure the assets and project future 
cash flows.  In Boise County, the court evaluated Boise’s assets and its 
ability to issue warrants for future payment in relation to the adverse 
judgment, and calculated that Boise had not established insolvency.402  In 
Ellicott, the court found that the school building authority had alternative 
sources to successfully make its debt payments, including reserve fund 
assets and a defaulted rent payment.403  In Pierce County Housing 
Authority, the court noted that nearly all the assets of the authority were 
subject to liens and thus it could not monetize its assets to avoid insolvency, 
and therefore was insolvent.404 
In a one-time event bankruptcy, current insolvency should be favored.  
As the debt is relatively quantifiable in these bankruptcies, particularly 
those caused by an adverse judgment or a bad contract, the municipality 
should be able to show that it is currently insolvent to receive relief.  If a 
municipality in a one-time event bankruptcy attempted to show prospective 
insolvency instead of current insolvency, the court should be wary of the 
petition.  Otherwise, a financially sound entity may be able to simply 
project future insolvency to discharge debt, without making sufficient effort 
to avoid the petition.  Of course, a municipality making these projections 
still would have to show that they negotiated in good faith and desired to 
effect a plan to adjust its debts pursuant to § 109(4),405 but it is difficult to 
demonstrate that prospective estimates are incorrect. 
Given the uncertainty of future projections, for one-time events, 
prospective insolvency should be considered as a significant negative 
against a one-time petition.  Even in the event where a municipality could 
argue that it does not know the extent of the problem, like the Jefferson 
County fraud,406 it is better for the municipality to understand the fraud pre-
petition.  However, if a municipality has debts that are accelerating and still 
uncertain—similar to Orange County, where losses resulted from bad 
investments and swaps—unless the losses can be stopped by opting out of 
the investment or swap, that situation should be treated more prospectively 
with respect to insolvency. 
In a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, the insolvency determination 
can be weighted less heavily, as other factors, such as good faith, should be 
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allocated a higher weight.  If a structurally imbalanced municipality is 
currently insolvent, then insolvency is satisfied unless the calculation is 
manipulated or assets are shielded—which would implicate good faith and 
asset valuation respectively.  If a structurally imbalanced municipality 
under severe financial stress files a prospective insolvency petition, it is 
likely simply a question of the date of the future insolvency, because the 
structural imbalance has already manifested itself over a lengthy period of 
time.  In the structurally imbalanced prospective insolvency case, the court 
should treat the projections less strictly, as the city will continue to 
hemorrhage funds and dissipate assets if by technicality it is prevented from 
utilizing Chapter 9. 
2.   Asset Valuation in One-Time Event Bankruptcies 
Asset valuation and use in one-time event bankruptcies is another 
important consideration for the bankruptcy court.  While § 904 prevents 
bankruptcy courts from interfering with the debtor’s property or revenues, 
or the use or enjoyment of any income-producing property,407 it does not 
prevent a bankruptcy court from evaluating a municipality’s good faith 
utilization of an asset.  Assets can be considered essential, nonessential, and 
potential. 
This Note previously defined essential assets as assets that are used to 
provide services to residents, including government buildings, vehicles, 
supplies, and infrastructure systems, as well as land generally.408  Land is 
included as essential because it is specifically what Congress was protecting 
when it included § 904.409  In response to the Supreme Court’s Ashton 
ruling, where the Court expressed worry that a state may be “no longer free 
to manage their own affairs,”410 Congress enacted § 904 to protect 
“property.”  When Congress instituted the Bankruptcy Code in the 1930s, 
many municipalities in consideration were municipalities making large 
infrastructure investments.  Ashton, for example, concerned the Cameron 
County Water Improvement District.411  Bekins, the case that affirmed the 
constitutionality of Chapter 9 bankruptcy, concerned an irrigation 
district.412  Both precedent-setting cases focused on municipalities that were 
financing the expansion of essential assets to provide services to residents. 
Thus, essential assets generally should not be considered in the Chapter 9 
analysis. 
Nonessential assets were likely not contemplated as heavily, if at all, by 
Congress.  This Note previously defined nonessential assets as assets that 
are not critical for a municipality to provide public services, and it 
identified examples of nonessential assets as art, equivalent monetary 
instruments, mineral reserves, and seized, abandoned, or unused 
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property.413  The bankruptcy court should consider nonessential assets in 
the context of the insolvency and good faith analyses.  It seems fair to 
consider valuable mineral reserves beneath municipal lands if the extraction 
of these assets could be completed in an environmentally neutral way.  For 
example, if the municipality is fortuitously located above precious metal 
reserves in an unutilized section of the municipality, it would likely be 
unfair to shield these assets from consideration in the insolvency and good 
faith analyses.  Of course, arguments for monetization of mineral reserves 
should not be extended to argue for applications like logging or stripping 
top-soil, because these applications likely interfere too much with a 
municipality’s property. 
Fairness seems to dictate that seized property should be considered in the 
insolvency and good faith analyses.  Because a municipality generally 
seizes private property resulting from failure to pay monetary taxes, the 
seized property should be included in insolvency calculation and in the 
good faith plan confirmation analysis.  Similarly, abandoned and unused 
property should be considered, particularly where the property served no 
public use other than in service delivery and no future public use was 
planned.  For example, if a municipal property used to serve as an 
equipment lot and maintenance depot, but has been abandoned by a 
municipality, this type of property should be considered.  Park land, on the 
other hand, serves a public use and generally should not be considered in 
any insolvency or good faith analyses. 
Art should be considered in a good faith analysis under certain 
circumstances.  In the simplest case, where valuable art is not accessible to 
the public and is simply being held by the municipality, the asset likely 
should be included in the insolvency and good faith analyses.  However, 
most valuable art falls into a trickier category where it is held in an art 
museum or otherwise available for the public.  Art museums serve the 
public as attractions and also may generate visits to the municipality as a 
tourist attraction, thus operating as an indirect method414 of revenue 
generation for a municipality.  For example, the DIA had 594,000 unique 
visits, and Artvest’s report compared the DIA to New York City’s 
Metropolitan Museum of Art in terms of its status as a city attraction.415  It 
is less clear under those circumstances whether the entirety of a collection 
should be monetized to pay creditors.  But it is hard to imagine that selling, 
for example, three out of 65,000 pieces of art for $230 to $440 million 
would deplete the overall cultural significance of the museum.416  
 
 413. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 414. And, in some cases, a direct method if the museum is owned by the municipality and 
it is profitable. 
 415. See ARTVEST, supra note 297, at 40–41. 
 416. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.  The Wedding Dance, Self Portrait with 
Straw Hat, and The Visitation represent between $230 and $440 million.  Of course, in 
certain instances a museum has a famous anchor piece, like the Mona Lisa in the Louvre, 
that represents their collection and people travel in large numbers to view.  In Detroit’s case, 
the most significant works associated with the museum are likely the murals by Diego 
Rivera, commissioned by the city in the 1930s, that are designated as a national historic 
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Naturally, there is also tension between several of the sympathetic creditors, 
such as pensioners, when those classes receive reduced recoveries so that a 
$200 million painting can stay in an art museum. 
Potential assets—such as taxes—should be considered strongly in one-
time event bankruptcies in conjunction with the good faith analysis.  With 
the sum certain shortfall, monetization of potential assets has the ability to 
alleviate the financial stress without creating a spiraling situation, where a 
tax increase is available to the municipality outside of bankruptcy.  If the 
municipality did not pursue a reasonable potential tax increase to address 
the one-time stress, electing instead for bankruptcy, this may be treated as 
evidence that the municipality did not exhibit good faith. 
3.   Asset Valuation in Structurally Imbalanced Bankruptcies 
In a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, utilization of nonessential assets 
should be weighted highly, particularly if the nonessential assets are 
significant enough to fully remedy the financial situation.  For example, if a 
county in Texas has $1 billion in unfunded liabilities and $5 billion in easily 
obtainable mineral assets, then the municipality’s utilization of those assets 
should be considered by the court in the context of the insolvency and good 
faith analyses.  However, if the nonessential assets cannot address the 
structural imbalance, then nonessential asset utilization need only to be 
considered in the good faith analysis at the confirmation stage.  Finally, in a 
structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, if a municipality acquired nonessential 
assets using municipal funds, this would weigh toward finding that those 
specific assets should be utilized in the confirmation phase as evidence of 
good faith.  For example, if a municipality acquired a Picasso for $100 
million in 1990 using taxpayer money and desired to petition for Chapter 9 
several years later, the court should at a minimum analyze the monetization 
of that nonessential asset in the context of good faith in the confirmation 
plan. 
It is important to note that in both one-time event and structurally 
imbalanced bankruptcies, the utilization of nonessential assets should be 
analyzed with consideration to the liquidity of markets.  The idea is that a 
municipality, when contemplating Chapter 9 or devising a confirmation 
plan, should, in certain situations, have its utilization of cash-convertible 
assets analyzed by the courts.  This should not be extrapolated to require a 
municipality to monetize every nonessential asset regardless of whether 
there is a real market for that asset, nor is it an argument that a municipality 
should monetize the entirety of their libraries or historical societies.  But 
when certain high value nonessential items are in the mix, a municipality’s 
utilization of those assets should be considered as described above. 
Potential assets should be given low weight in structural imbalance 
bankruptcy.  In a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, the short-fall is 
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accelerating and is not likely to be solved by raising taxes on the 
population.  This likely should be the case where the municipality has 
poorer residents already subjected to significant taxes.  An exception to 
potential asset utilization in structural imbalanced bankruptcies would be a 
municipality with a comparatively low tax rate, where the application of an 
average tax rate would solve the underlying structural imbalance. 
C.   The Funnel to the “Good Faith” Factor 
Good faith is prevalent throughout the Chapter 9 process, from petition to 
confirmation, as a financially troubled municipality attempts to adjust its 
debts.  However, bankruptcy courts’ analyses of good faith sometimes fail 
to connect the dots, leading to questionable results that may have 
implications on future municipality and creditor behavior.  In the petition 
phase, Collier’s good faith factors provide helpful texture to analyze good 
faith.417 
In one-time event bankruptcies, good faith tends to be highly important 
overall.  It is also specifically significant in the utilization of nonessential 
and potential assets and in the calculation of insolvency.  In a one-time 
event bankruptcy, the analysis is relatively straightforward when utilizing 
the Collier factors.  As was evident in Boise County, the county was 
essentially solvent but was trying to dismiss a controversial judgment.418  
Boise attempted to demonstrate insolvency by showing that it was not 
paying debts as they became due, but the accounting utilized speculative 
debt and failed to account for surplus funds and its ability to use warrants to 
raise capital.419  Applying the Collier factors, the scope and nature of the 
financial distress was a large, but not monumental, controversial judgment; 
alternatives existed outside of Chapter 9; and its motivation was possibly 
tainted.  Similarly, in In re Sullivan County Regional Refuse Disposal 
District, the refusal to contemplate legal tax increases was evidence of bad 
faith.420  Applying the Collier factors, alternatives existed outside of 
Chapter 9 and the financial distress was not extraordinarily deep.  In one-
time filings, the Collier factors can be applied in a straightforward manner 
at the petition phase. 
In structurally imbalanced bankruptcies, the good faith analysis becomes 
more complicated, as there are typically more interested parties involved 
and rational recourse outside of Chapter 9 may be less likely.  At the 
petition phase, a good faith challenge can apparently be rebuffed, as it was 
in Detroit, if the financial problems are the “type contemplated for Chapter 
9 relief,” the reasons are consistent with the purpose of Chapter 9, the city 
made efforts to improve its finances, and city residents would be severely 
 
 417. See supra note 342 and accompanying text. 
 418. See Eileen Norcross, Boise County, Idaho files for Bankruptcy, MERCATUS CTR. AT 
GEORGE MASON UNIV. (Mar. 4, 2011), http://neighborhoodeffects.mercatus.org 
/2011/03/04/boise-county-idaho-files-for-bankruptcy/. 
 419. See supra notes 328–34 and accompanying text. 
 420. See supra note 345. 
2752 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
prejudiced if the case was dismissed.421  The Detroit court acknowledged 
that some evidence that supported a lack of good faith, but noted that the 
fact that residents would face “severe prejudice” weighed heavily toward 
finding good faith.422  If a petition, like Detroit’s, is described by the judge 
as a “foregone conclusion,”423 then the good faith at the petition phase is 
not being given much weight in current practice.  Further, in Detroit, the 
judge found that the city did not meet the § 109(d)(2) “good faith” 
negotiations test, but alternatively that the city satisfied the § 109(d)(3) test 
that negotiations were impracticable.424 
If a municipality has not advanced a plan to adjust its debts prior to the 
bankruptcy petition, and a creditor’s pre-petition good faith challenge is 
easily overcome in a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, then good faith at 
the confirmation phase becomes even more paramount.  Further, after the 
initial eligibility determination, debtors have a significant amount of leeway 
in the details of the plan and the treatment of each creditor class.425  The 
Code requires that the bankruptcy court confirm the debt adjustment plan 
only if “the plan has been proposed in good faith.”426 
The application of good faith at the confirmation stage is erratic, as plans 
tend to favor certain unsecured creditors over others.  Favored treatment 
may result from political pressure from constituents that may be voters, 
taxpayers, and pension recipients at the same time, or simply sympathy for 
the “plight of pensioners who are part of the local community.”427  This, 
“[c]oupled with the dynamics of voter and tax-payer constituency,” may 
cause municipal managers and elected officials to exhibit bias toward those 
constituencies as opposed to the “faceless” bondholders.428  For example, 
Detroit’s confirmation plan initially proposed less than a 10 percent 
recovery for unsecured bondholders while providing a 60 percent combined 
recovery for unsecured pension creditors.429  Similarly, Stockton’s proposal 
allocated several bond creditors pennies on the dollar, while leaving 
Stockton’s pension payments untouched.  Creditors in both Stockton and 
Detroit challenged the plan on the grounds of “unfair discrimination,” 
arguing that the debt adjustment plans provided materially disparate 
treatment to two classes of bonds having substantially similar legal rights.  
On its face, this appears to run afoul of the § 1129(b)(2) requirement that no 
unsecured junior creditors receive or retains any property before senior 
creditors are paid and also appears to “unfairly discriminate” between 
certain classes of unsecured creditors.  But case law has permitted this, 
yielding to the realities of complex municipal situations and recognizing 
that not every creditor situation is created equally.  Thus, a careful, non-
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biased good faith analysis is paramount to achieving a fair result for the 
municipality and its varying creditors. 
A good faith analysis in a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy naturally 
has many levels of texture to consider.  For example, if a municipality is 
financially undermined by a complex derivative structure that it entered into 
in good faith, a smaller recovery for the derivative holder as compared to 
pensioners may make sense in the good faith context.  However, if the 
municipality was significantly damaged by promising overly generous 
deferred compensation plans to city employees, and in bankruptcy chooses 
not to modify their unsecured debt while providing less than ten percent 
recovery to bondholders, would generally indicate bad faith on two fronts.  
First, choosing not to modify one of the main forcing functions of the filing 
in the first place, particularly when that unfunded liability will grow post-
confirmation, seems to indicate a lack of good faith.  After all, the 
bankruptcy court is not only required to find that the bankruptcy does not 
unfairly discriminate at the confirmation stage, but also has to find that it 
desires to effect a plan to adjust its debts.  And if the debt adjustment plan 
does not appear to solve the fundamental issues, questions arise as to 
whether the municipality desired to effect a plan to adjust its debts in the 
first place. 
This situation seems analogous to Stockton, where the average firefighter 
cost to Stockton was $157,000 a year in pay and benefits, with the ability to 
retire at age 50.430  Typical pension benefits in Stockton were 90 percent of 
an employee’s highest yearly salary plus nearly free lifetime health 
benefits.431  With $800 million in unfunded liabilities and only $300 million 
in general fund–backed debt, the unfunded legacy liabilities are 2.6 times 
greater than the general fund debt, and that ratio would continue to climb 
without modification because of increasing legacy costs, whereas some 
other capital expenses can be deferred. 
Stockton’s situation can be contrasted with Providence, Rhode Island, for 
example, which was able to avoid bankruptcy in a situation where it faced a 
$30 million annual structural deficit combined with $900 million in 
unfunded pension liabilities.432  Providence’s city council voted to cap 
pension benefits at 150 percent of median household income and suspend 
yearly cost-of-living benefit adjustments.433  The state legislature 
implemented this measure because it was worried about contagion effects in 
other municipalities within the state.  A previous bankruptcy filing, the 
2010 Central Falls, Rhode Island petition operated as a backdrop to the 
Providence bankruptcy avoidance.  Central Falls, a city of 19,000 residents, 
had $80 million in unfunded liabilities due to population reduction, 
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recession impacts, and legacy benefits.434  Prior to bankruptcy, the Rhode 
Island legislature provided a statutory lien to secure general obligation 
bonds to have priority in bankruptcy.435  Rhode Island was concerned that if 
the bondholders were not paid the state municipal bond market would risk 
exhibiting a “contagion effect,” and bondholders would be unwilling to 
invest without significant interest rate increases.436  In the bankruptcy, the 
unsecured pension creditors took cuts up to 55 percent, with a minimum 
yearly floor, and general unsecured creditors will receive 45 percent 
maximum.437  Pensioners agreed to the deal after the state agreed to 
augment their pensions for five years.438 
A bankruptcy court could easily apply the type of common sense analysis 
used by the Rhode Island legislature to analyze good faith in the context of 
bankruptcy proceedings.  In a situation where legacy benefits are a primary 
driver of insolvency, analyzing pension recoveries in the context of median 
municipality income provides context to whether the deferred benefits were 
overly generous and how much they can be modified without “severe 
prejudice” to those employees.  Once compared to median income, the 
court can turn to the disparity of recovery percentages between the 
pensioners and the remaining unsecured creditors—including bondholders, 
trade, and tort creditors—to determine if the plan “unfairly discriminates.” 
To apply this concept, we can use Stockton and Detroit as examples.  A 
city like Stockton is in contrast to Detroit, where the city arguably acted in 
good faith in the modification of pensions and health benefits.  In Detroit, 
the average pension was not lavish, averaging approximately $19,000 per 
employee and $30,000 for its police and fire retirees, as compared to 
Detroit’s median income of $24,820.439  In Detroit, the sheer numbers of 
retirees and lack of pre-funding fueled the massive unfunded liabilities.440  
In contrast, Stockton’s average benefits were median household income is 
$47,246,441 while the typical police and fire retiree benefits cost the city 
approximately $141,000, nearly three times greater than the median 
household income.  Evidence of disproportionate benefits to public 
employees combined with a plan’s failure to address underlying structural 
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problems while allocating pennies on the dollar to bondholders is the type 
of unfair discrimination that, in conjunction with the municipality’s total 
control over the plan, seems to be indicative of a lack of good faith. 
From a public policy perspective, adopting a system where 
disproportionate benefits bestowed from the public coffer are scrutinized 
heavily during a Chapter 9 proceeding will inform public employee 
bargaining in the future.  This type of system will promote current 
compensation rather than deferred compensation.  Of course, retirement and 
future health care could still be accommodated using a defined contribution 
rather than a defined benefit system, thereby reducing the risk of 
disproportionately large future payments and giving individuals more 
control over their benefits.  Also, if a generous deferred compensation plan 
is negotiated with this type of legal precedent in place, sophisticated unions 
will be able to evaluate the credit risk of a municipality in the same way 
sophisticated bondholders evaluate credit risk, and courts can then reach 
fair and equitable outcomes that meet the expectations of all creditors. 
CONCLUSION 
Municipalities face financial pressures for many reasons, including but 
not limited to legacy pension and health care costs, deindustrialization, 
reduced tax revenue, and poor fiscal management.442  Municipal debt is at 
record highs and funding levels among municipalities are unevenly 
distributed.  With growing and concentrated financial pressures, municipal 
bankruptcies will continue to occur and likely will increase in size and 
frequency.  Recent municipal bankruptcy decisions have led to questionable 
and inconsistent results, and the area is ripe for a refined method of 
analysis. 
Analyzing municipal bankruptcy by categorizing the bankruptcy as a 
one-time event bankruptcy or a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy lends 
clarity to the analysis at both the petition and confirmation stage.  In a one-
time event bankruptcy, the court should place more weight on prospective 
versus current insolvency and it should be wary of any prospective 
insolvency one-time event petitions.  Likewise, the pre-petition utilization 
of potential and nonessential assets should be weighted heavily in the 
current insolvency calculation, particularly if utilization could effectively 
remedy the financial crisis.  Good faith at the petition and confirmation 
stage can be analyzed using the Collier factors for a one-time event 
bankruptcy. 
In a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, the court should be more 
inclined to permit prospective bankruptcy as long as the future projections 
have reasonable clarity.  Nonessential and potential assets should be 
considered at the petition phase of a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy if 
utilization could completely remedy the problem, and utilization should be 
considered in the confirmation plan in the good faith context.  Good faith 
should play an extremely important role in a structurally imbalanced 
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bankruptcy, particularly at the confirmation phase, and can be informed 
using common sense methods such as analyzing legacy benefits with 
respect to median income.  The good faith analysis also should consider 
whether the municipality’s debt adjustment plan will realistically solve the 
structural imbalance and lean against confirming a plan that may result in 
another future filing. 
The factors addressed herein are intended to provide context to the 
analysis of Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceedings relating to the most frequent 
situations that arise.  Grouping the bankruptcy situations into one-time 
event versus structurally imbalanced bankruptcies illuminates the critical 
issues that relate to insolvency, nonessential asset usage, specific 
authorization, and good faith.  The test provides bankruptcy courts with an 
additional framework to consider as they exercise their judgment in Chapter 
9 proceedings. 
